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jeudi 10 mars 2016

Canada, Comer lost ! Privy council ? Committee for Monetary and Economic Reform (“COMER”) v. Canada

Federal Court Decisions, Date Modified: 2016-03-10




To COMER Members

Mark Twain, while in London, England on a speaking tour, once had occasion to announce that,

“reports of [his] death had been greatly exaggerated”.

History has repeated itself with the recent internet messaging that the COMER – BoC lawsuit

“has reached its end / is over / kaput !”. Far from it ! ! !

Statement from Constitutional Lawyer Rocco Galati representing COMER in this on-going action:


“ DECISION OF FEDERAL COURT — FEBRUARY 8TH, 2016 ”



“On February 8th, 2016, Justice Russell of the Federal Court, after having his decision of April 24th, 2014 upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal on January 26th, 2015, made a decision on the government’s second motion to strike after COMER filed its amended statement of claim on March 26th, 2015.



“In the latest decision of February 8th, 2016 Justice Russell, in law, inexplicably reversed himself from the earlier decision. In his earlier decision he had refused to strike large portions of the claim, most notably the facts going to the declaratory relief sought as to the Bank of Canada and the constitutional issues.



“He further blatantly erred in deciding that Declaratory relief cannot be sought as stand-alone relief, in the absence of a cause of action, which is contrary to Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence which was cited and read to the Court.



“Moreover, because the Federal Court of Appeal had upheld his decision of April 24th, 2014, in reversing his earlier decision, he effectively overturned the Federal court of Appeal’s decision upholding his earlier decision, which is contrary to law.



“On March 3rd, 2016, COMER filed an appeal, to the Federal Court of Appeal, from the decision of Justice Russell, dated February 8th, 2016.



“If redress is not had at the Federal Court of Appeal, COMER is committed to then taking the case to the Supreme Court of Canada.”

( end of statement )



Because Mr. Galati has been out of town due to other pressing commitments, we were not able to provide an authoritative report to Members earlier. And because he will have to be away again,



Mr. Galati cannot meet with us before Saturday, March 26th.


Date: 20160208

Docket: T-2010-11
Citation: 2016 FC 147
Ottawa, Ontario, February 8, 2016
PRESENT:    The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
COMMITTEE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC REFORM (“COMER”), WILLIAM KREHM, AND ANN EMMETT
Plaintiffs
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE, THE BANK OF CANADA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS

I.                   INTRODUCTION

[1]               This is a motion by the Defendants under Rule 221 of the Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106 [Rules] to strike the Plaintiffs’ Amended Statement of Claim of March 26, 2015 [Amended Claim].

II.                BACKGROUND

[2]               The Plaintiff, Committee for Monetary and Economic Reform [COMER], is an economic “think-tank” based in Toronto. COMER was established in 1970 and is dedicated to research and publications on issues of monetary and economic reform in Canada. The individual Plaintiffs are members of COMER who have an interest in economic policy.

A.                History of the Litigation

[3]               This litigation was commenced on December 12, 2011, with the filing of the original Statement of Claim, which was amended in minor ways on January 19, 2012 [Original Claim].
[4]               On August 9, 2013, the Original Claim was struck out in its entirety by Prothonotary Aalto, without leave to amend. Upon appeal from the decision of the Prothonotary, I struck the Original Claim in its entirety, but with leave to amend, by way of order on April 24, 2014 [Order of April 24, 2014].
[5]               Appeal and cross-appeals of my Order of April 24, 2014 were dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal on January 26, 2015. The Plaintiffs filed the Amended Claim on March 26, 2015. The Defendants now move to strike out this Amended Claim.

B.                 The Amended Claim

[6]               The Plaintiffs’ Amended Claim, while an amended version of the Original Claim, continues to seek a series of declarations relating to three basic assertions, as noted in my previous Order of April 24, 2014: first, that the Bank of Canada Act, RSC, 1985, c B-2 [Bank Act] provides for interest-free loans to the federal, provincial and municipal governments for the purposes of “human capital expenditures,” and the Defendants have failed to fulfill their legal duties to ensure such loans are made, resulting in lower human capital expenditures by governments to the detriment of all Canadians; second, that the Government of Canada uses flawed accounting methods in relation to public finances, thereby understating the benefit of “human capital expenditures” and undermining Parliament’s constitutional role as the guardian of the public purse; and third, that these and other harms are the result of Canadian fiscal and monetary policy being, in part, controlled by private foreign interests through Canada’s involvement in international monetary and financial institutions.
[7]               The pleadings of fact which accompany the Amended Claim define “human capital expenditures” as those that encourage the qualitative and quantitative progress of a nation by way of the promotion of the health, education and quality of life of individuals, in order to make them more productive economic actors, through institutions such as schools, universities, hospitals and other public infrastructures. The Plaintiffs state that investment in human capital is the most productive investment and expenditure a government can make.
[8]               The Amended Claim seeks nine declarations. The first is that ss 18(i) and (j) of the Bank Act require the Minister of Finance [Minister] and the Government of Canada to request, and the Bank of Canada to provide, interest-free loans for the purpose of human capital expenditures to all levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal).
[9]               Second, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the Defendants have not only abdicated their statutory and constitutional duties with respect to ss 18(i) and (j) of the Bank Act, but that they have also, by way of a refusal to request and make interest-free loans under ss 18(i) and (j), caused a negative and destructive impact on Canadians through the disintegration of Canada’s economy, its financial institutions, increases in public debt, a decrease in social services, as well as a widening gap between rich and poor, with the continuing disappearance of the middle class. In the accompanying facts to their Amended Claim, the Plaintiffs use a June 11, 2014 request of the Town of Lakeshore, Ontario as an example of an occasion when the Minister refused a request for an interest-free loan without regard to either the nature of the request or pertinent provisions of theBank Act. The Plaintiffs say that the Minister’s reasons for refusing the Town of Lakeshore’s request are both financially and economically fallacious and not in accordance with statutory duties.
[10]           Third, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that s 18(m) of the Bank Act, and its administration and operation, is unconstitutional and of no force and effect. They say the Defendants have abdicated their constitutional duties and handed them over to international, private entities whose interests have, in effect, been placed above those of Canadians and the primacy of the Canadian Constitution. The Plaintiffs state that no sovereign government such as Canada should ever borrow money from commercial banks at interest, when it can borrow from its own central bank interest-free, particularly when that central bank, unlike the banks of any other G-8 nation, is publically established, mandated, owned and accountable to Parliament and the Minister, and was created with that purpose as one of its main functions.
[11]           Fourth, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the fact that the minutes of meetings involving the Governor of the Bank of Canada [Governor] and other G-8 central bank governors have been kept secret is ultra vires the Governor, as being contrary to the Bank Act – particularly s 24 – and ought to be considered unconstitutional conduct.
[12]           The fifth declaration sought is that, by allowing the Governor to keep the nature and content of international bank meetings secret, by not exercising the authority and duty contained in ss 18(i) and (j) of the Bank Act, and in enacting s 18(m) of the Bank Act, Parliament has abdicated its duties and functions as mandated by ss 91(1)(a), (3), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20) of theConstitution Act, 1867, as well as s 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
[13]           The Plaintiffs’ sixth and seventh declarations involve the manner in which the Minister accounts for public finances, which the Plaintiffs say is conceptually and logically wrong. The Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Minister is required to list human capital expenditures — including those related to infrastructure as “assets” rather than “liabilities” in budgetary accounting — as well as all revenues prior to the return of tax credits to individual and corporate tax payers, then subtract tax credits, then subtract total expenditures in order to arrive at an annual “surplus” or “deficit,” as required by s 91(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
[14]           The eighth declaration sought is that taxes imposed to pay for the interest on the deficit and the debt to private bankers, both domestic and foreign, are illegal and unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs claim that this is the result of a breach of the constitutional right(s) to “no taxation without representation” which occurs when the Minister fails to disclose anticipated revenues to Parliament before the return of anticipated tax credits, prior to determining whether an anticipated surplus or deficit will be incurred, in the tabling of the budget. This means that a full and proper Parliamentary debate cannot properly take place, thus breaching the right to no taxation without representation under both ss 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as well as the unwritten constitutional imperatives to the same effect. Also, it results in an infringement of the Plaintiffs’ right to vote under s 3 of the Charter, which is tied to the right to no taxation without representation with respect to the Minister’s constitutional violations. The result is a breach of the terms of the Bank Act relating to interest-free loans and the consequent constitutional violations by the Executive of its duty to govern, and its relinquishing of sovereignty and statutory decision-making to private foreign bankers.
[15]           The ninth and final declaration sought is that the “privative clause” in s 30.1 of the Bank Acteither (a) does not apply to prevent judicial review, by way of action or otherwise, with respect to statutorily or constitutionally ultra vires actions, or to prevent the recovery or damages based on such actions; or (b) if it does prevent judicial review and recovery, is unconstitutional and of no force and effect, as breaching the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to judicial review and the underlying constitutional imperatives of the rule of law, Constitutionalism and Federalism.
[16]           Besides the declaratory relief sought, the Plaintiffs also in the Amended Claim request damages in the amount of $10,000.00 each for individual Plaintiff: William Krehm, Anne Emmett, and for ten COMER Steering Committee [Steering Committee] members named in the Amended Claim, for the breach of their constitutional right of “no taxation without representation” and the inseparable infringement of the right to vote due to alleged constitutional breaches by the Minister. Further, the Plaintiffs request the return of the portion of illegal and unconstitutional tax, to be calculated and calibrated at trial, for each of the Plaintiffs and the members of the Steering Committing, consisting of the proportion of taxes to pay interest charges on the deficit, and debt between 2011 and the time of trial, paid by the Plaintiffs and Steering Committee members, due to the statutory and constitutional breaches of the Defendants’ rights in refusing and/or failing to cover deficits in the budget by way of interest-free loans, as well as the breach of their right to no taxation without representation, to be calculated by the compounded interest changes set out in the budget, as a percentage of the budget, calculated as the same percentage paid by the Plaintiffs and Steering Committee members, to be calculated at trial.

III.             ISSUES

[17]           The Defendants have brought a motion to strike the Amended Claim on the grounds that,inter alia:
1.      it fails to comply with the leave to amend granted and fails to remedy the problems identified in the Order of April 24, 2014;
2.      it seeks to add parties and new claims that are not permissible by virtue of the leave to amend and the Rules;
3.      it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants, or any one of them;
4.      it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
5.      it is an abuse of process of the Court;
6.      it fails to disclose facts which would show that the action or inaction of the Defendants, or any one of them, could cause an infringement of the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Charter or the Constitution;
7.      the causal link between the alleged action or inaction of the Defendants or any one of them, and the alleged infringement of the Plaintiffs’ rights is too uncertain, speculative and hypothetical to sustain a cause of action;
8.      it seeks declaratory relief only available under s 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7 [Federal Courts Act] and in any event such relief is not available to the Plaintiffs;
9.      the Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek an advisory opinion from the Court;
10.  it seeks to adjudicate matters that are not justiciable;
11.  it seeks to impose a fetter on the sovereignty of Parliament and seeks to overrule or disregard the privilege of the House of Commons over its own debates and internal procedures;
12.  the Plaintiffs do not have a s 3 Charter right to any particular form of taxation and there is no causal connection, or legitimate expectation between their vote and the presentation of a budget before the House of Commons and resulting legislation;
13.  it concerns matters outside the jurisdiction of the Court; and
14.  the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the Amended Claim as of right, nor can they meet the necessary requirements for the grant of public interest standing.

IV.             STATUTORY PROVISIONS

[18]           The following provisions of the Bank Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Powers and business
Pouvoirs
18. The Bank may
18. La Banque peut :
[…]
[…]
(i) make loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or the government of a province on taking security in readily marketable securities issued or guaranteed by Canada or any province;
i) consentir des prêts ou avances, pour des périodes d’au plus six mois, au gouvernement du Canada ou d’une province en grevant d’une sûreté des valeurs mobilières facilement négociables, émises ou garanties par le Canada ou cette province;
(j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government’s estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan;
j) consentir des prêts au gouvernement du Canada ou d’une province, à condition que, d’une part, le montant non remboursé des prêts ne dépasse, à aucun moment, une certaine fraction des recettes estimatives du gouvernement en cause pour l’exercice en cours — un tiers dans le cas du Canada, un quart dans celui d’une province — et que, d’autre part, les prêts soient remboursés avant la fin du premier trimestre de l’exercice suivant;
[…]
[…]
(m) open accounts in a central bank in any other country or in the Bank for International Settlements, accept deposits from central banks in other countries, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and any other official international financial organization, act as agent or mandatary, or depository or correspondent for any of those banks or organizations, and pay interest on any of those deposits;
m) ouvrir des comptes dans une banque centrale étrangère ou dans la Banque des règlements internationaux, accepter des dépôts — pouvant porter intérêt — de banques centrales étrangères, de la Banque des règlements internationaux, du Fonds monétaire international, de la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement et de tout autre organisme financier international officiel, et leur servir de mandataire, dépositaire ou correspondant;
[…]
[…]
Fiscal agent of Canadian Government
Agent financier du gouvernement canadien
24. (1) The Bank shall act as fiscal agent of the Government of Canada.
24. (1) La Banque remplit les fonctions d’agent financier du gouvernement du Canada.
Charge for acting
Honoraires
(1.1) With the consent of the Minister, the Bank may charge for acting as fiscal agent of the Government of Canada.
(1.1) La Banque peut, avec le consentement du ministre, exiger des honoraires pour remplir de telles fonctions.
To manage public debt
Gestion de la dette publique
(2) The Bank, if and when required by the Minister to do so, shall act as agent for the Government of Canada in the payment of interest and principal and generally in respect of the management of the public debt of Canada.
(2) Sur demande du ministre, la Banque fait office de mandataire du gouvernement du Canada pour la gestion de la dette publique, notamment pour le paiement des intérêts et du principal de celle-ci.
Canadian Government cheques to be paid or negotiated at par
Encaissement des chèques du gouvernement canadien
(3) The Bank shall not make any charge for cashing or negotiating a cheque drawn on the Receiver General or on the account of the Receiver General, or for cashing or negotiating any other instrument issued as authority for the payment of money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, or on a cheque drawn in favour of the Government of Canada or any of its departments and tendered for deposit in the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
(3) La Banque ne peut exiger de frais pour l’encaissement ou la négociation de chèques tirés sur le receveur général ou pour son compte et d’autres effets autorisant des paiements sur le Trésor, ni pour le dépôt au Trésor de chèques faits à l’ordre du gouvernement du Canada ou d’un ministère fédéral.
[…]
[…]
No liability if in good faith
Immunité judiciaire
30.1 No action lies against Her Majesty, the Minister, any officer, employee or director of the Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Governor for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended or authorized to be executed or performed.
30.1 Sa Majesté, le ministre, les administrateurs, les cadres ou les employés de la Banque ou toute autre personne agissant sous les ordres du gouverneur bénéficient de l’immunité judiciaire pour les actes ou omissions commis de bonne foi dans l’exercice — autorisé ou requis — des pouvoirs et fonctions conférés par la présente loi.
[19]           The following provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, are applicable in these proceedings:
Appropriation and Tax Bills
Bills pour lever des crédits et des impôts
53. Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or for imposing any Tax or Impost, shall originate in the House of Commons.
53. Tout bill ayant pour but l’appropriation d’une portion quelconque du revenu public, ou la création de taxes ou d’impôts, devra originer dans la Chambre des Communes.
Recommendation of Money Votes
Recommandation des crédits
54. It shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt or pass any Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost, to any Purpose that has not been first recommended to that House by Message of the Governor General in the Session in which such Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill is proposed.
54. Il ne sera pas loisible à la Chambre des Communes d’adopter aucune résolution, adresse ou bill pour l’appropriation d’une partie quelconque du revenu public, ou d’aucune taxe ou impôt, à un objet qui n’aura pas, au préalable, été recommandé à la chambre par un message du gouverneur-général durant la session pendant laquelle telle résolution, adresse ou bill est proposé.
[…]
[…]
Application to Legislatures of Provisions respecting Money Votes, etc.
Application aux législatures des dispositions relatives aux crédits, etc.
90. The following Provisions of this Act respecting the Parliament of Canada, namely, — the Provisions relating to Appropriation and Tax Bills, the Recommendation of Money Votes, the Assent to Bills, the Disallowance of Acts, and the Signification of Pleasure on Bills reserved, — shall extend and apply to the Legislatures of the several Provinces as if those Provisions were here re-enacted and made applicable in Terms to the respective Provinces and the Legislatures thereof, with the Substitution of the Lieutenant Governor of the Province for the Governor General, of the Governor General for the Queen and for a Secretary of State, of One Year for Two Years, and of the Province for Canada.
90. Les dispositions suivantes de la présente loi, concernant le parlement du Canada, savoir : — les dispositions relatives aux bills d’appropriation et d’impôts, à la recommandation de votes de deniers, à la sanction des bills, au désaveu des lois, et à la signification du bon plaisir quant aux bills réservés, — s’étendront et s’appliqueront aux législatures des différentes provinces, tout comme si elles étaient ici décrétées et rendues expressément applicables aux provinces respectives et à leurs législatures, en substituant toutefois le lieutenant-gouverneur de la province au gouverneur-général, le gouverneur-général à la Reine et au secrétaire d’État, un an à deux ans, et la province au Canada.
Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
Autorité législative du parlement du Canada
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
91. Il sera loisible à la Reine, de l’avis et du consentement du Sénat et de la Chambre des Communes, de faire des lois pour la paix, l’ordre et le bon gouvernement du Canada, relativement à toutes les matières ne tombant pas dans les catégories de sujets par la présente loi exclusivement assignés aux législatures des provinces; mais, pour plus de garantie, sans toutefois restreindre la généralité des termes ci-haut employés dans le présent article, il est par la présente déclaré que (nonobstant toute disposition contraire énoncée dans la présente loi) l’autorité législative exclusive du parlement du Canada s’étend à toutes les matières tombant dans les catégories de sujets ci-dessous énumérés, savoir :
[…]
[…]
1A. The Public Debt and Property. (45)
1A. La dette et la propriété publiques. (45)
[…]
[…]
3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.
3. Le prélèvement de deniers par tous modes ou systèmes de taxation.
4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit.
4. L’emprunt de deniers sur le crédit public.
[…]
[…]
6. The Census and Statistics.
6. Le recensement et les statistiques.
[…]
[…]
14. Currency and Coinage.
14. Le cours monétaire et le monnayage.
[…]
[…]
16. Savings Banks.
16. Les caisses d’épargne.
[…]
[…]
18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.
18. Les lettres de change et les billets promissoires.
19. Interest.
19. L’intérêt de l’argent.
20. Legal Tender.
20. Les offres légales.
[…]
[…]
[20]           The following provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982, are applicable in these proceedings:
Democratic rights of citizens
Droits démocratiques des citoyens
3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.
3. Tout citoyen canadien a le droit de vote et est éligible aux élections législatives fédérales ou provinciales.
Life, liberty and security of person
Vie, liberté et sécurité
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale.
[…]
[…]
Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law
Égalité devant la loi, égalité de bénéfice et protection égale de la loi
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s’applique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques.
[…]
[…]
Commitment to promote equal opportunities
Engagements relatifs à l’égalité des chances
36. (1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to
36. (1) Sous réserve des compétences législatives du Parlement et des législatures et de leur droit de les exercer, le Parlement et les législatures, ainsi que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, s’engagent à :
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
a) promouvoir l’égalité des chances de tous les Canadiens dans la recherche de leur bien-être;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
b) favoriser le développement économique pour réduire l’inégalité des chances;
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
c) fournir à tous les Canadiens, à un niveau de qualité acceptable, les services publics essentiels.
Commitment respecting public services
Engagement relatif aux services publics
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
(2) Le Parlement et le gouvernement du Canada prennent l’engagement de principe de faire des paiements de péréquation propres à donner aux gouvernements provinciaux des revenus suffisants pour les mettre en mesure d’assurer les services publics à un niveau de qualité et de fiscalité sensiblement comparables.
[21]           The following provision of the Rules is applicable in these proceedings:
Motion to Strike
Requête en radiation
221. (1) On motion, the Court may, at any time, order that a pleading, or anything contained therein, be struck out, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that it
221. (1) À tout moment, la Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner la radiation de tout ou partie d’un acte de procédure, avec ou sans autorisation de le modifier, au motif, selon le cas:
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be,
(a) qu’il ne révèle aucune cause d’action ou de défense valable.
(b) is immaterial or redundant
(b) qu’il n’est pas pertinent ou qu’il est redondant ;
(c) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious,
(c) qu’il est scandaleux, frivole ou vexatoire ;
(d) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action,
(d) qu’il risque de nuire à l’instruction équitable de l’action ou de la retarder;
(e) constitutes a departure from a previous pleading, or
(e) qu’il diverge d’un acte de procédure antérieur ;
(f) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court,
(f) qu’il constitue autrement un abus de procédure.
and may order the action be dismissed or judgement entered accordingly.
Elle peut aussi ordonner que l’action soit rejetée ou qu’un jugement soit enregistré en conséquence.

V.                ARGUMENT

A.                Defendants’ Submissions on the Motion

(1)               The Test on a Motion to Strike

[22]           The Defendants say that the test to strike out a pleading under Rule 221 is whether it is plain and obvious on the facts pleaded that the action cannot succeed: Sivak et al v The Queen et al, 2012 FC 272 at para 15 [Sivak]; R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42 at para 17 [Imperial Tobacco]. While there is a rule that material facts in a statement of claim should be taken as true when determining whether the claim discloses a reasonable cause of action, this does not require the court to accept at face value bare assumptions or allegations which may be regarded as scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or legal submissions dressed up as facts: Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at para 27 [Operation Dismantle]; Carten v Canada, 2009 FC 1233 at para 31 [Carten].

(2)               Reasonable Cause of Action

[23]           The Rules require that the pleading of material facts disclose a reasonable cause of action. A pleading must: (i) state facts and not merely conclusions of law; (ii) include material facts; (iii) state facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved; and (iv) state facts concisely in a summary form: Carten, above; Sivak, above; Rules 174 and 181 of the Rules. The Plaintiffs’ Amended Claim fails to do this. Its allegations do not provide the necessary elements of each cause of action together with the material facts. Furthermore, it is not clear if the Plaintiffs continue to rely on the allegations of conspiracy and misfeasance as facts to support these allegations are not included in the pleadings. As a result, it cannot be said that the Amended Claim’s assertions result in the liability of the Defendants, or any one of them.
[24]           The Amended Claim includes amendments that are not permissible under the Rules: new parties (the Steering Committee members) and a cause of action not grounded in the facts already pleaded (the allegation of a breach of s 3 Charter rights) have been added. The Defendants further argue that the Amended Claim breaches the terms of the permission to amend by failing to cure the problems identified in the Order of April 24, 2014.
[25]           The Defendants say that there is no constitutional duty to present the federal budget in the manner sought by the Plaintiffs. As a result, no breach of the principle of no taxation without representation has occurred. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that no taxation without representation means that the Crown may not levy a tax without the authority of Parliament:Kingstreet Investments v New Brunswick, [2007] 1 SCR 3 at para 14; Constitution Act, 1867, ss 53 and 90. The present circumstances suggest that this constitutional requirement has been satisfied.
[26]           As the master of its own procedure, Parliament cannot be said to have a duty to legislate. No cause of action can result from failing to enact a law: New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 SCR 319 at 354-355 [NB Broadcasting]; Telezone Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [2004] OJ No 5, 69 OR (3d) 161 (CA) [Telezone]; Lucas v Toronto Services Board, 51 OR (3d) 783 at para 10; Moriss v Attorney General, [1995] EWJ No 297 (England and Wales Court of Appeal) at para 38.
[27]           Citing s 91(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Plaintiffs allege that the accounting method employed in the budgetary process is unconstitutional. However, this subsection, “the Census and Statistics,” is simply one of the classes of subjects enumerated in s 91 over which Parliament has exclusive legislative authority; it does not impose a duty to legislate and, as such, is of little help to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants point out that, in any event, much of what is being sought by the Plaintiffs is publically available from the Department of Finance. For example, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2012 can be found online at http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2012/taxexp12-eng.asp.
[28]           With respect to the Plaintiffs’ legitimate expectations argument, the Defendants state that it falls under the doctrine of fairness or natural justice, and does not create substantive rights: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 26. The only procedure due to a Canadian citizen is that proposed legislation receive three readings in the House of Commons and the Senate and that it receive Royal Assent: Authorson v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 39 [Authorson]. The procedural rights described by the Plaintiffs have never existed: Penikett v The Queen, 1987 CanLii 145 (YK CA) at 17-18.
[29]           The Defendants say that the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Magna Carta does not assist them. While the document holds a seminal place in the development of Canadian constitutional principles, it has been displaced by legislation in both the United Kingdom and Canada. It has no contemporary independent legal significance or weight and is therefore “amenable to ordinary legislative change”Rocco Galati et al v Canada, 2015 FC 91 at para 74 [Galati].
[30]           Parliamentary privilege, including its corresponding powers and immunities, ensures the proper functioning of Parliament and is one of the ways in which the constitutional separation of powers is respected: Telezone, above, at para 13; Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 at para 21 [Vaid]. In Authorson, above, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision inReference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, indicating that the way in which a legislative body proceeds is a matter immune from judicial review and is one of self-definition and inherent authority. The United Kingdom Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Will & Mar sess 2, c 2, partially codifies parliamentary privilege at article 9, precluding any court from impeaching or questioning the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament: Prebble v Television New Zealand, [1994] UKPC 3, [1995] 1 AC 321 (JCPC); Hamilton v al Fayed, [2000] 2 All ER 224 (HL) [Hamilton v al Fayed].
[31]           Once a category of privilege is established, it is not the courts but Parliament that may determine whether a particular exercise of privilege is necessary or appropriate: Parliament of Canada Act, RSC 1985, c P-1, ss 4-5 [Parliament of Canada Act]; Pickin v British Railways Board, [1974] AC 765 (HL) at 790; Vaid, above, at para 29. Recognized categories of privilege include freedom of speech and control over debates and proceedings in Parliament: Vaid, above. The Defendants assert that the budget debate, its presentation, supporting papers and associated legislation fall under this category of privilege: Roman Corp v Hudon’s Bay Oil & Gas Co, [1973] 3 SCR 820 at 827-828; NB Broadcasting, above.
[32]           By virtue of ss 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867“Money Bills” must originate in the House of Commons, and the Governor General must grant a recommendation for the expenditure of public funds. There is no suggestion in the Amended Claim that these requirements have not been satisfied.
[33]           COMER, as an unincorporated association, cannot benefit from the protection provided for the electoral rights of citizens provided by s 3 of the Charter. While this protection could apply to the two individual Plaintiffs, provided they are Canadian citizens, neither has plead such a cause of action. The Amended Claim makes no suggestion that the Plaintiffs’ access to “meaningful participation” in the electoral process – what the Supreme Court has determined is protected by s 3 – has been in any way affected: Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 SCR 912 at para 27.
[34]           In order for a cause of action to be brought under the Charter, at least a threat of violation of a Charter right must be established: Operation Dismantle, above, at para 7. The Amended Claim does not demonstrate a link between the actions of any of the Defendants and the alleged s 3 harms. The Defendants further submit that s 3 has never been interpreted to encompass any rights or legitimate expectations that a claimant’s elected representatives will enact any particular measures or refrain from doing so. 
[35]           With respect to the Plaintiffs’ damages claim for the return of allegedly unconstitutional taxes, the Defendants assert that no factual support has been brought forward to support such a claim.
[36]           The Defendants also address several other allegations in the Amended Claim. As regards the alleged misfeasance by public officers in the withholding of anticipated total revenue, the Defendants say that the necessary elements of the tort – including any alleged state of mind of a person involved, wilful default, malice or fraudulent intention – are not made out: St John’s Port Authority v Adventure Tours Inc, 2011 FC 198 at para 25. Of note is the absence of facts that would support a finding of deliberate and unlawful misconduct of a public officer, or that a public officer was aware that his or her conduct was unlawful and likely to harm the Plaintiffs: Odhavji v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 at paras 23, 28-29. In terms of the nominate tort of statutory breach, the Supreme Court of Canada has established that it does not exist: The Queen v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 SCR at 225. Even so, the remedy for a breach of statutory duty by a public authority is judicial review for invalidity: Holland v Saskatchewan, 2008 SCC at para 9.
[37]           The Plaintiffs also make a claim of conspiracy, but again fail to plead the material facts necessary to support such an allegation, such as the identity of the officials engaged in the conduct, the type of agreement entered into, the time the agreement was reached, the lawful or unlawful means that were to be used, and the nature of the intended injury to the Plaintiffs. Other requirements that are missing include an agreement between two or more persons and intent to injure: G.H.L. Fridman, Introduction to the Canadian Law of Torts, 2nd ed (Markham: Butterworths, 2003) at 185.
[38]           The Plaintiffs plead that, through s 24 of the Bank Act, Parliament has allowed the impugned actions by the Government of Canada. However, the Defendants point out that this provision has nothing to do with the keeping of minutes by the Bank. In addition, the Plaintiffs have not provided the grounds necessary to demonstrate how s 30.1, which provides that no action lies against the Crown, the Minister of Finance and officials of the Bank of Canada for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties under the Bank Act, would affect their rights.

(3)               Declaratory Relief

[39]           The Defendants make a series of submissions in relation to the Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief. First, they say the Federal Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory and coercive remedies only as prescribed in the Federal Courts Act. Section 18 indicates that extraordinary remedies can only be obtained on an application for judicial review under s 18.1. Subsection 18.4(2) allows the Court to direct that an application for judicial review be treated and proceeded with as an action, but does not authorize the Plaintiffs to initiate a request for declaratory or coercive relief in an action.
[40]           The requirements for proper judicial review, as set out by s 18.1, include that only someone who is “directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought” may bring an application. The Plaintiffs are not directly affected.
[41]           The Plaintiffs’ claim damages for a “return of the portion of illegal and unconstitutional tax.”The Defendants say that it is hard to see how these taxes can be claimed without impugning the legality of the instruments that gave rise to their increase. Additionally, the law is clear that the Plaintiffs may only seek to attack administrative action by state actors by way of judicial review:Telezone, above, at para 52.
[42]           Second, in order to claim declaratory relief, entitlement must be established. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a declaration of unconstitutionality is a declaratory remedy for the settlement of a real dispute: Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 SCC 3 [Khadr]. Before the court can issue a declaratory remedy, it must have jurisdiction over the issue at bar, the question before the court must be real and not theoretical, and the person raising it must have a real interest in raising it. The Defendants say that the Plaintiffs have not met any of these requirements.
[43]           Third, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to refer matters for an advisory opinion. As determined in the Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs are asking that the Court declare that their reading of the Bank Act and the Constitution is correct. This is akin to asking the Court for an advisory opinion. Without an adequate description of how a private right or interest has been affected, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that the Court can rule on and find that statutory and constitutional breaches have occurred.
[44]           Fourth, declaratory relief necessitates a real dispute between the parties and cannot be issued in response to one that is merely hypothetical: Operation Dismantle, above, at para 33;Diabo v Whitesand First Nation, 2011 FCA 96; Re Danson and the Attorney-General of Ontario, (1987) 60 OR (2d) 679 at 685 (CA). A real dispute is not present here.
[45]           Fifth, the Plaintiffs have no real interest or right that has been affected by the interpretation or operation of s 18 of the Bank Act. As noted in the Order of April 24, 2014, despite claiming to be acting for “all other Canadians,” the Plaintiffs have failed to produce a pleading demonstrating how “all other Canadians” have been impacted in a way that constitutes an infringement of an individual or collective right. The Court is confined to declaring contested legal rights, and cannot give advisory opinions on the law generally: Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] AC 435 at 501-502 [Gouriet].

(4)               Justiciability

[46]           Justiciability is a normative inquiry that involves looking to the subject matter of the question, the manner of its presentation and the appropriateness of judicial adjudication: Friends of the Earth - Les Ami(e)s de la Terre v Canada (Governor in Council), 2009 FCA 297 [Friends of the Earth].
[47]           The Defendants argue that the Court can, and in this case should, deal with statutory interpretation on a motion to strike: Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc, 2007 FC 837 at para 38. The Defendants state that it is critical to note that s 18 of the Bank Act, which enumerates the business and powers of the Bank of Canada, states that the Bank “may” do what is listed at paragraphs (a) through (p). The Plaintiffs want paragraphs (i) and (j) to be read as imperative: that the Bank of Canada is statutorily required, when necessary, to make interest-free loans for the purposes they define. Such mandatory language is not present and to invoke it borders on absurdity as it would suggest that Parliament did not follow through on its very purpose for creating a Bank of Canada, as set out in the Bank Act’s preamble: to regulate credit and currency in the best interest of the economic life of the Canadian nation.
[48]           If the Bank Act is to be read as imperative, the Defendants say that it will become necessary for the Court to detail the occasions when the Government of Canada “must” request loans and the Bank “must” provide them. Without these specifications, any declaration made by the Court will be meaningless, and the courts will not make a declaration where “it will serve little or no purposes”Terrasses Zarolega Inc v RIO, [1980] 1 SCR at 106-107.
[49]           The Defendants point out that absent “objective legal criteria,” the Court should decline to hear a matter since such a proceeding would entail significant consideration of policy matters, which are beyond the proper subject matter for judicial review: Friends of the Earth, above. at para 33.
[50]           In asking for a declaration that the Minister and the Government of Canada be required to request interest-free loans for “human capital” and or “infrastructure” expenditures, the Plaintiffs are not merely seeking an interpretation of the Bank Act; they are seeking a coercive order. Section 18 does not support such a request. The Defendants argue that whether a particular loan should be sought by the Government of Canada and made by the Bank is an inappropriate matter for judicial involvement, both institutionally and constitutionally.
[51]           Furthermore, the Bank Act does not set out any requirements in regards to how the Bank ought to exercise its lending powers. Loan-making is clearly subject to the Bank’s discretion and contemplation of a wide range of circumstances that the Bank is best-positioned to weigh and consider.
[52]           The Defendants say that under the Plaintiffs’ plan, the task of regulating credit and currency in the best interest of the economic life of Canada would become the responsibility of the Court, which would have to pronounce the requirements for loans on an ad hoc basis, with coercive orders.
[53]           Furthermore, the Plaintiffs’ amendments have not addressed the deficiency related to the so-called improper “handing-off” to international institutions. The Defendants suggest that the Plaintiffs want the Court to instigate a grand inquisition in regard to monetary and fiscal matters. This is not the proper role of the Court and there is no such duty on the Defendants.
[54]           The allegation of “handing-off” to international institutions is not a legal cause of action and is not justiciable. It is not concerned with the objective legality of an action or inaction, but instead with the abstract concept of “private interests” being placed above the “interests of Canadians.”Only the people of Canada can, through the election of their representatives, determine the interests of Canadians.
[55]           Government policy decisions and issues that are better decided by a branch of government are non-justiciable: Imperial Tobacco, above, at para 72; Lorne M Sossin: Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada (Carswell: Toronto, 1999) at 4-5.
[56]           The Defendants say that the Amended Claim attacks the way in which Canada develops and implements fiscal and monetary policy, as well as its participation in international economic organizations. It attempts to address abstruse issues relating to the governance of the Bank of Canada and fiscal policy-making – things that are properly the concern of governments, not the judiciary: Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20 at para 302; Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424 at para 36; RJR- MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at paras 21, 68; Archibald v Canada, [1997] 3 FC 335 at paras 54, 83.
[57]           The Amended Claim is so broad and general in its parameters that it defies judicial manageability.

(5)               Court’s Jurisdiction

[58]           The Defendants say that the test for determining if a matter is within the Federal Court’s jurisdiction is stipulated in ITO-International Terminal Operators LTD v Miida Electronics, [1986] 1 SCR 752 at 766 [ITO-International]:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament.
2. There must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be “a law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s. 101 of theConstitution Act.
[59]           As regards the first component of the test, there is no statutory grant for a suit to be brought against the Bank of Canada. It has been determined that s 17 of the Federal Courts Act, which provides that the Court has concurrent original jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed against the Crown, does not apply to a statutory corporation acting as an agent of the Crown. Therefore, the Bank of Canada, a statutory corporation created by the Bank Act, cannot be said to be the Crown or a Crown Agent. The powers in s 18 are not fiscal agent powers, but rather powers that the Bank of Canada is entitled to exercise in its own right.
[60]           Also, the Court has no jurisdiction over a Minister of the Crown. He or she may not be sued in his or her representative capacity; the Queen is the only proper defendant in an action against the Crown: Peter G White Management v Canada, 2006 FCA 190.
[61]           The Defendants also say that the second part of the ITO-International jurisdictional test has not been met. It is not fulfilled simply by the fact that an allegedly misused power emanates from a federal statute. The Plaintiffs do not have specific rights, nor is there a detailed, corresponding statutory framework. The allegations against the Defendants relating to the abdication of statutory and constitutional duties can only be grounded in negligence, civil conspiracy or misfeasance. These matters are based on tort law and would properly be applied by the provincial courts.
[62]           As regards the third portion of the test, s 3 of the Charter is not properly characterized as a “law of Canada” in the s 101 sense. To support this statement, the Defendants apply the reasoning in Kigowa v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 1 FC 804 at para 8, which examined ss 7 and 9 of the Charter

(6)               Standing

[63]           As a final issue, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this claim. Their private rights have not been interfered with, nor have they suffered special damages specific to them from an interference with a public right: Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607 at paras 18-22 [Finlay].
[64]           A general disdain for a particular law or governmental action is not enough to meet the standard of “genuine interest” for public interest standing. A stronger nexus than what is presented in the Amended Claim is required between the party making the claim and the impugned legislation:Canadian Council of Churches v Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 236; Marchand v Ontario (2006), 81 OR (3d) 172 (SCJ).

B.                 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion

[65]           The Plaintiffs assert, to the extent that the Order of April 24, 2014 refused to strike the declaratory relief (the bulk of the Amended Claim), and ruled that it is justiciable, that this motion to strike is an abuse of process because res judicata and issue estoppel apply.

(1)               The Test on a Motion to Strike

[66]           In terms of the general principles that ought to be applied on a motion to strike, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs must be taken as proven: Canada (Attorney General) v Inuit Tapirasat of Canada, [1980] 2 SCR 735; Nelles v Ontario (1989), DLR (4th) 609 (SCC) [Nelles]; Operation Dismantle, above; Hunt v Carey Canada Inc [1990] 2 SCR 959 [Hunt]; Dumont v Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 1 SCR 279 [Dumont]; Nash v Ontario (1995), 27 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Nash]; Canada v Arsenault, 2009 FCA 242 [Arsenault].
[67]           The Plaintiffs echo the test referenced by the Defendants, asserting that a claim can be struck only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is bad beyond argument: Nelles, above, at para 3. The Court has provided further guidance in Dumont, above, that an outcome should be“plain and obvious” or “beyond doubt” before striking can be invoked (at para 2). Striking cannot be justified by a claim that raises an “arguable, difficult or important point of law”Hunt, above, at para 55.
[68]           The novelty of the Amended Claim is not reason in and of itself to strike it: Nash, above, at para 11; Hanson v Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 19 OR (3d) 142 (CA); Adams-Smith v Christian Horizons (1997), 3 OR (3d) 640 (Ont Gen Div). Additionally, matters that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: RD Belanger & Associates Ltd v Stadium Corp of Ontario Ltd (1991), 5 OR (3d) 778 (CA). In order for the Defendants to succeed, the Plaintiffs state that a case from the same jurisdiction that squarely deals with, and rejects, the very same issue must be presented: Dalex Co v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (1994), 19 OR (3d) 215 (CA). The Court should be generous when interpreting the drafting of the pleadings, and allow for amendments prior to striking: Grant v Cormier – Grant et al (2001), 56 OR (3d) 215 (CA).
[69]           The Plaintiffs also remind the Court that the line between fact and evidence is not always clear (Liebmann v Canada, [1994] 2 FC 3 at para 20) and that the Amended Claim must be taken as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, not as reconfigured by the Defendants: Arsenault, above, at para 10.

(2)               Constitutional Claims

[70]           As regards the general principles to be applied to their constitutional claims, the Plaintiffs state that, as previously plead to the Prothonotary and to me, the Constitution does not belong to either the federal or provincial legislatures, but rather to Canadians: Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1951] SCR 31 [Nova Scotia (AG)]. Parliament and the Executive are bound by constitutional norms, and neither can abdicate its duty to govern:Canada (Wheat Board) v Hallet and Carey Ltd, [1951] SCR 81 [Wheat Board]; Re George Edwin Gray, (1918) 57 SCR 150 [Re Gray] at 157; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1988] 2 SCR 217 [Reference re Secession of Quebec].
[71]           Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that legislative omissions can lead to constitutional breaches (Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493) and that all executive action and inaction must conform to constitutional norms: Air Canada v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1986] 2 SCR 539; Khadr, above.
[72]           With respect to the budgetary issue, the Plaintiffs submit that: (a) contrary to Arsenault, the Defendants misstate the Plaintiffs’ Amended Claim; and (b) that s 3 of the Charter is intrinsically tied to the right of no taxation without representation and/or any other underlying right directly connected to the right to vote.
[73]           The Plaintiffs say the Defendants misstate and fail to properly respond to the constitutional question. Two erroneous submissions and assumptions have been made. First, it is not plain and obvious that s 91(6) does not impose a duty, or that it is not arguable: Wheat Board, above; Re Gray, above, at 157; Reference re Secession of Quebec, above. Second, the Defendants have overlooked that the constitutional, primary duty in the budgetary process, is to outline all revenues and expenditures. This duty has evolved from the Magna Carta and is tied to the constitutional right to no taxation without representation. The Defendants have removed and failed to reveal the true revenue(s) to Parliament, which is the only body that can constitutionally impose tax and therefore approve the proposed spending. The Minister of Finance has essentially removed the ability of Parliament to properly review, debate and pass the budget’s expenditures and corresponding tax provisions.
[74]           The Plaintiffs’ position is misconstrued by the Defendants as an attempt to argue a right in the Magna Carta. All that is stated, the Plaintiffs argue, is that the right can be traced back to theMagna Carta and is codified by ss 53, 54 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It is submitted that the tort actions, which are founded in this right and the inseparable right to vote under s 3 of theCharter, may be “novel,” but comply with the rules of pleading and the Order of April 24, 2014, while meeting the test for a reasonable cause of action.
[75]           Furthermore, the tort action was not, and should not be, framed in public misfeasance or conspiracy. Rather, the actions of the Minister of Finance, with respect to the budgeting process, and those of the Bank of Canada officials who relegated or abdicated their duty, relate to the constitutional breaches and torts pleaded.

(3)               Declaratory Relief

[76]           On the issue of declaratory relief, the Plaintiffs say that the Defendants’ submissions on the topic are, in any event, misguided and contrary to the jurisprudence. The Plaintiffs argue that the issue has already been decided by my Order of April 24, 2014 and was upheld by the Court of Appeal when it dismissed the Defendants’ cross-appeal. Therefore, the matter constitutes resjudicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process: City of Toronto v CUPE, Local 79, [2003] 3 SCR 77.
[77]           Declaratory relief goes to the crux of the constitutional right to judicial review: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 27-31; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 757 at para 38; Canada v Solosky, [1980] 1 SCR 821 at 830. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reaffirmed the scope of the right to declaratory relief, indicating that it cannot be statute-barred: Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at paras 134, 140 and 143.
[78]           The Defendants ignore ss 2 and 17 of the Federal Courts Act as well as Rule 64 of theRules. The Court has held that declaratory relief is available, and may be sought, under s 17 of theFederal Courts ActEdwards v Canada (2000) 181 FTR 219 [Edwards]; Khadr, above.

(4)               Justiciability

[79]           As regards the issue of justiciability, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the constitutionality of legislation has always been a justiciable issue, the Plaintiffs argue that just because the subject-matter at hand deals with socio-economic matters does not make it non-justiciable.
[80]           The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have “figure-skated” from the notion of justiciability to that of a “political question.” The Plaintiffs state:
The “Political question” doctrine is an old doctrine adopted early in the jurisprudence over “pure questions of policy” or “choice” over “policies” over which no statutory nor constitutional dimensions exists over which the Court can adjudicate. In a word the subject-matter did not involve asserted statutory or constitutional rights. This is not the situation in the within case.
[81]           In terms of issues dealing with socio-economic policies that the Supreme Court of Canada has found to be justiciable, the Plaintiffs point to the following:
         Whether “wage and price” controls were within the competence of the federal Parliament:Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 1975, [1976] 2 SCR 373;
         Whether the limits on transfer payments between the federal government and provincial governments could unilaterally be altered: Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (Canada), [1991] 2 SCR 525 [CAP Reference];
         A challenge by an individual regarding whether transfer payments by the federal government to the provincial governments with respect to welfare payments were illegal because the province was breaching certain provisions of the Canada Assistance Plan: Finlay, above.
[82]           The Plaintiffs assert that the clear test for justiciability is whether there is a “sufficient legal component to warrant the intervention of the judicial branch”CAP Reference, above, at para 33. The Amended Claim meets this test. When social policies are alleged to infringe or violateCharter-protected rights, they must be scrutinized; this does not exclude “political questions”:Chaoulli v Quebec (Procureur general), 2005 SCC 35 at paras 89, 183, 185. In such cases the question before the court is not whether the policy is sound, but rather whether it violates constitutional rights, which is a totally different question: Operation Dismantle, above, at 472.
[83]           The declaratory relief and damages sought in the Amended Claim are, according to the Plaintiffs, grounded in the interpretation of the Bank Act, and the constitutional duties and requirements of the budgetary process. These have not been respected. The Constitution, as a result, is being structurally violated and the Plaintiffs’ rights are being infringed.
[84]           The Defendants have confused the notion of justiciability with that of enforceability by not properly distinguishing between the declaratory relief and tort relief sought, and in viewing some of the declaratory relief as non-enforceable. The statutory right to seek declaratory relief is provided for by Rule 64 of the Rules, whether or not any consequential relief is or can be claimed. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that instances may exist where it is appropriate to declare but not enforce a right: Khadr, above.

(5)               Standing

[85]           Finally, the Plaintiffs submit that they clearly have standing to bring forward these justiciable issues on the facts pleaded. This standing is personal, but it is also public interest-based and is in line with recent jurisprudence: Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45; Galati, above.
[86]           The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the Constitution does not belong to the federal or provincial governments, but to Canadian citizens (Nova Scotia (AG), above), and that it is a tool for dispute resolution, of which one of the most important goals is to serve well those who make use of it: Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act, [1996] 1 SCR 186 at 210.
[87]           The Plaintiffs submit that it is time to revisit the issue of standing with respect to the constitutional validity of statutes and executive actions. In cases like the present one, concerned with the constitutional validity of statutes and/or executive actions by way of declaratory relief, public interest standing is a constitutional right.

VI.             ANALYSIS

[88]           Pursuant to my Order of April 24, 2014 (as endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal on January 6, 2015), the Plaintiffs have now served and filed the Amended Claim and the Defendants have brought a second motion to strike.
[89]           The background to this dispute is set out in my Order of April 24, 2014.

A.                The Amendments

[90]           While the Amended Claim maintains the declaratory relief described in paragraphs 1 to 10 substantially intact from their previous pleading, the Plaintiffs have dropped the allegations that the unlawful actions of the Defendants violate ss 7 and 15 of the Charter. Instead, the Plaintiffs now seek, as part of their declaratory relief, a declaration:
[…]
viii) that taxes imposed to pay for the interest on the deficit and debt to private bankers, both domestic and particularly foreign, are illegal and unconstitutional owing to,
A/      the breach of the constitutional right(s) to no taxation without representation resulting from the Finance Minister’s failure to disclose full anticipated revenues to MPs in Parliament, before the return of anticipated tax credits, prior to determining whether an anticipated surplus or deficit will be incurred, in the tabling of the budget, in that a full and proper debate cannot properly ensue as a result, thus breaching the right to no taxation without representation under both ss.53 and 90 of theConstitution Act, 1867, as well as the unwritten constitutional imperatives to the same effect;
B/      the infringement of the Plaintiffs’ right to vote, under s. 3 of the Charter, tied to the right to no taxation without representation with respect to the Minister of Finance’s constitutional violations;
C/      breach of the terms of the Bank of Canada Act, with respect to interest-free loans, and the consequent constitutional violations, by the Executive, of its duty to govern, and relinquishing sovereignty and statutory decision-making to private foreign bankers;
[…]
[91]           The Plaintiffs have also made it clear that their tort claims are not based upon public misfeasance and/or conspiracy. The new damages claim reads as follows:
[…]
(b)     damages in the amount of:
i)       $10,000.00 each for the Plaintiffs William Krehm and Ann Emmett, as well as the ten (10) named COMER Steering Committee members, named in paragraph 2(a) of the within statement of claim, for the breach of their constitutional right of “no taxation without representation” and the inseparable infringement of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, as tied to the right and imperative against no taxation without representation, due to the constitutional breaches by the Minister of Finance with respect to the budgetary process; and
ii)      return of the portion of illegal and unconstitutional tax, to be calculated and calibrated at trial, for each of the Plaintiffs and members of COMER’s Steering Committee, consisting of the proportion of taxes, to pay interest charges on the deficit, and debt, between 2011 and the time of trial, paid by the Plaintiffs and Steering Committee members of COMER, due to the statutory and constitutional breaches of the Defendants in refusing and/or failing to cover deficits in the budget by way of interest-free loans, as well as the breach of their right to no taxation without representation, to be calculated by the compounded interest changes set out in the budget, as a percentage of the budget, calculated as the same percentage paid by the Plaintiffs and Steering Committee members, to be calculated and calibrated at trial;
[…]
[92]           Other amendments throughout the Amended Claim either bolster the claims with more facts (e.g. paras 15(h) and 22) or reflect the basic shifts referred to above (see paras 39, 41, 43 and 47).

B.                 Rule 221 – Motion to Strike

[93]           As with the previous strike motion, there is no disagreement between the parties as to the basic jurisprudence that governs a motion to strike under Rule 221. For purposes of this motion, I adopt the principles set out in paras 66 and 68 of my Order of April 24, 2014. Essentially, the test for striking an action is a high one and the Defendants must show that it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action or that there is no reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. See Imperial Tobacco, above, at paras 17, 21 and 25.
[94]           As I found in my Order of April 24, 2014, this claim remains both novel and ambitious, but this does not mean that it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that it does not give rise to a reasonable cause of action or that there is no reasonable prospect that it will not succeed at trial.

C.                 Grounds for the Motion

[95]           The Defendants have raised a significant number of grounds for striking the Amended Claim. I will deal in turn with those grounds that I feel have substance and relevance.

(1)               Budget Presentation and Taxation

[96]           As regards the declaratory relief sought in paras 1(a)(vi) to (viii) of the Amended Claim dealing with the presentation of the Federal Budget by the Minister of Finance, that Defendants argue as follows:
12.    There is no constitutional duty of presenting the federal budget in the manner sought by the plaintiffs. There is no breach of the principle of “no taxation without representation”. This principle, as defined by the Supreme Court, means that the Crown may not levy a tax except with the authority of Parliament. This constitutional requirement was satisfied here.
13.    Parliament is master of its procedure. It is well recognized that there is no duty on Parliament to legislate. There is no cause of action for the omission of Parliament to enact any law.
14.    The plaintiffs allege that the accounting method used in the budgetary process is a breach of ss. 91(6) Constitution Act, 1867, which grants legislative power over “[t]he census and statistics” to Parliament. This provision will not aid them. Section 91 enumerates the classes of subjects and all matters coming within them to which the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada is granted – it does not impose duties on Parliament or the Government. A reference to a class of federal power in theConstitution Act, 1867 is not the imposition of a duty upon Parliament to legislate in respect of that subject matter. S. 91(6) – “the Census and Statistics” – is one of the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 91 for which it is declared in the Constitution Act, 1867 that “the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming within” this class of subjects.
15.    In any event, much of the information sought by the plaintiffs to be included in the budget documents presented before Parliament is publicly available from the Department of Finance, for example: Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2012 at: http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2012/taxexp12-eng.asp.
[footnotes omitted]
[97]           The facts supporting the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief on this issue are set out in paras 25-43 of the Amended Claim. The main judicial point is stated as follows:
[39]        The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the above “accounting method” used in the budgetary process are [sic] not in accordance with accepted accounting practices, are conceptually and logically wrong, and have the effect of perpetually making the real and actual picture of what total “revenues”, “total expenditures”, and what the annual deficit/surplus” [sic] actually is, what the annual “deficit/surplus” actually is, in any given year, and what, as a result the standing national “debt” is. Moreover, and more importantly, the Plaintiffs state, and fact is [sic], that such “accounting” methods foreclose any actual or real debate, or consideration, by elected MPs, in Parliament, as the actual financial picture is not available nor disclosed to either Parliamentarians nor the Canadian public. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that such accounting method breaches s. 91(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the duty of the Defendant(s) to maintain accurate “statistics”, and the ability of MPs in Parliament to fully and openly debate the budget, which breaches the Plaintiffs’ right(s) to “no taxation without representation” and also infringes their right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, as tied to the no right to taxation without representation.
[…]
[41]        The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that this failure and/or calculated choice by the Defendant Minister of Finance to withhold anticipated total revenue, before the subtraction of anticipated tax credits, along with anticipated expenditures, in the budget bill(s), violates the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to no taxation without representation as guaranteed by ss. 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and unwritten constitutional imperative underlying it, dating back to the Magna Carta, as well as diminishes, devalues and infringes on their right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter with respect to taxation as tied to deficit, debt, and the availability to debate the alternative of avoiding both by, inter alia, exercising the interest-free Bank of Canada loans under s. 18 of the Bank of Canada Act.
[98]           It is true, as the Defendants say, that the Plaintiffs take issue with the way the Minister presents the federal budget to Parliament. However, the allegations set out above are not just that the Minister’s accounting methods are fallacious because they fail to take account of human capital and do not appropriately take tax credits into account. If this was the point of the claims, then clearly it would be nothing more than a debate about proper accounting procedures in the context of the federal budget. However, the Plaintiffs provide the facts about how the federal budget is presented to Parliament and say why they think it is inappropriate before they go on to state the legal basis of their claim. And the legal basis of the claim is that the Minister’s accounting methods and practices breach s 91(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867 because they mean the Defendants are not maintaining and presenting accurate statistics, which in turn breaches s 3 of the Charterbecause, in the end, inaccurate and misleading statistics prevent any meaningful debate on the budget in Parliament. This means in turn that MPs cannot fulfil their representative function and the Plaintiffs (at least the individual Plaintiffs) are therefore being taxed without any real representative input on the budget. This undermines s 3 of the Charter and the guarantees under ss 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This is my understanding of the Amended Claim on this issue.
[99]           Clearly, the Plaintiffs disagree with the way the Minister compiles and presents the budget to Parliament. They know that this, in itself, is not a legal issue they can bring to the Court. So they have hitched their complaints to s 91(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867, s 3 of the Charter and the no taxation without representation principle. Can this hitching be equated with any previous application of the constitutional principles and provisions cited and relied upon? Not to my knowledge. But that is not the issue before me. Charter litigation generally suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada may find a Charter or constitutional breach that has not been previously identified.
[100]       The Plaintiffs’ target is the executive branch of government as embodied in the Minister of Finance. It is the Minister’s actions that are alleged to thwart the Parliamentary process and to breach the Constitution Act, 1867 and s 3 of the Charter. It has to be admitted that the arguments underlying the Plaintiffs’ assertion of a Constitution and a Charter breach appear at this stage to be somewhat novel and esoteric but, as I have already said, this is not a sufficient ground for saying that they disclose no reasonable cause of action or that there is no reasonable prospect of success at trial.
[101]       The Plaintiffs reiterated the same points clearly in their oral arguments:
The case before you is there is an executive breach of a constitutional requirement by the Minister of Finance with respect to the budget process, and that as a result the legislation that comes out of Parliament breaches the constitutional right to no taxation without representation. Why? The MPs are blindfolded.
[Transcript of Proceedings p 38, lines 17-23]
The right to vote includes the right to effective representation. If the MPs are blinded by executive constitutional breaches by the Minister of Finance, how does that ensure effective representation?
[Transcript of Proceedings p 39, lines 1-5]
[N]owhere in the pleadings are we asking Parliament to legislate. We are simply saying that there’s an abdication of executive and parliamentary duty with respect to the budget as pleaded. That is a different matter.
And the failure to act applies equally to the executive as it does to the legislative with respect to constitutional breaches….
[Transcript of Proceedings p 39, lines 15-21]
And the actual revenues are not presented to Parliament. That is what we have pleaded. That is the fact.
[Transcript of Proceedings p 46, lines 20-22]
At paragraph 22, I set out the codification of these principles in sections 53, 54, and 90, and then state that by removing and not revealing the true revenues of Parliament, which is the only body which can constitutionally impose tax and thus approve the proposed spending from the speech from the throne, the Minister of Finance is removing the elected MPs’ ability to properly review and debate the budget and pass its expenditure and corresponding taxing provisions through elected representatives of the House of Commons. The ancient constitutional maxim of no taxation without representation was reaffirmed post-Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Education Reference.
[Transcript of Proceedings p 50, line 21 to p 51, line 5]
[102]       It seems to me that these arguments and assertions cannot apply to COMER itself, which has no right to vote. As regards the individual Plaintiffs, even assuming they pay tax, the allegations remain abstract and theoretical. A central allegation – unsupported by facts – is that MPs are voting blind and have been hoodwinked by the Minister of Finance. There are no facts pleaded to support this bald allegation. MPs may well understand the issues raised by the Plaintiffs concerning budgetary accounting practices, but may have decided to accept them. The Plaintiffs are alleging that Parliament is being misled by the Minister, but that the Plaintiffs are not.
[103]       There are no facts to say which MPs represent the individual Plaintiffs and whether those MPs have been approached and asked to deal with the issues raised in this claim or whether, having been made aware of the Plaintiffs’ concerns, those MPs have voted for or against the budget. If MPs for the individual Plaintiffs have been apprised of the problem then, no matter how they vote, it is difficult to see how the Plaintiffs are not represented in Parliament on this issue. Representation does not mean that MPs must vote in accordance with the wishes of individual constituents. If representative MPs have not been contacted, then it is difficult to understand why the individual Plaintiffs have come to Court to ask that it make findings about their rights of representation in Parliament.
[104]       On the other hand, if MPs, or at least those which represent the individual Plaintiffs are aware of the accounting concerns that the Plaintiffs raise, then it seems to me there can be no undermining of the voting and representation rights of the individual Plaintiffs.
[105]       There are no facts in the pleadings to suggest that any MPs are “voting blind” or are being misled by the Minister of Finance. Similarly, there are none to establish that Parliament does not monitor and assess the budgetary process, including the way the budget is compiled and presented by the Minister of Finance. The logic of the Amended Claim is that if Parliament is not adopting and acting upon the Plaintiffs’ concerns about the budgetary process then Parliamentarians are blind. This is an unsupported assertion. It is not a fact.
[106]       There is nothing more than a bald assertion that the Minister of Finance is “blindfolding” his Parliamentary colleagues and leading them astray to the detriment of the individual Plaintiffs, and, presumably, all Canadians with a right to vote.
[107]       Even at an abstract level, this seems far-fetched, to say the least. The Plaintiffs are asking the Court to simply assume that Parliament does not have the wherewithal to understand the way the budget is compiled and presented. The logic here is that, because the budget is not being presented as the Plaintiffs think it ought to be presented, their Parliamentary representatives are being hoodwinked by the Minister of Finance and obviously do not know what they are doing when they pass a budget. This position is presumptive and unsupported by any facts. It remains an abstract debate about how the budget should be presented.
[108]       Bald assertions, without supporting facts, are not sufficient to satisfy the rules of pleading. See Rule 174 and accompanying jurisprudence.
[109]       There is nothing in the facts as pleaded in the Amended Claim to suggest that Parliament is not fully aware of the criticisms levelled by the Plaintiffs against the Minister of Finance and that parliamentarians are not free to question and debate any budget presented from the perspective of those criticisms. Hence, there is nothing to support the allegation that the ability of MPs in Parliament to fully and openly debate the budget is impeded in any way. Further, if the Minister of Finance, in compiling the budget, chooses not to take “human capital” into account and/or chooses to withhold anticipated total revenue, before the subtraction of anticipated tax credits, along with anticipated expenditures, in budget bills, these choices also become the will of Parliament following the established procedures for debating and passing budgets. The Plaintiffs can have no right to insist that Parliament should only debate and pass budgets in accordance with the principles and procedures which they approve of and advocate. If the Plaintiffs disagree with the process then, like everyone else, they have access to their own Parliamentary representatives. Hence, in my view, there is no factual basis in the Amended Claim to support an allegation that the Constitution Act,1867, s 3 of the Charter or any constitutional principle is breached on the principle of no taxation without representation. If the individual Plaintiffs have a vote, then they are fully represented in Parliament, and it is Parliament that decides whether or not to pass the budget presented by the Minister of Finance in accordance with its own procedures. No facts are pleaded to suggest that Parliament is not fully aware of the kinds of criticisms that the Plaintiffs have raised in this action against the Minister and the budgetary process, or that Parliament is not aware that the budgetary process is not open to the kinds of criticisms that the Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Claim.
[110]       The Supreme Court of Canada made the following general point in Authorson, above, at para 38, quoting Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, above:
How Houses of Parliament proceed, how a provincial legislative assembly proceeds is in either case a matter of selfdefinition, subject to any overriding constitutional or selfimposed statutory or indoor prescription.  It is unnecessary here to embark on any historical review of the “court” aspect of Parliament and the immunity of its procedures from judicial review.  Courts come into the picture when legislation is enacted and not before (unless references are made to them for their opinion on a bill or a proposed enactment).  It would be incompatible with the selfregulating — “inherent” is as apt a word — authority of Houses of Parliament to deny their capacity to pass any kind of resolution.  Reference may appropriately be made to art. 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1689, undoubtedly in force as part of the law of Canada, which provides that “Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament”.
[111]       The Plaintiffs are not attacking any particular budget legislation that may have had an impact upon them that gives rise to a cause of action in any court of law. They are attacking the Parliamentary process that they say is used to present, debate and pass budget bills into law. They want the Court to interfere, albeit on Constitutional and Charter grounds, with the way Parliament goes about its business. In my view, the jurisprudence is clear that the Court cannot do this. The same conclusions must be reached even if the Court looks at the matter from the perspective of“when legislation is enacted and not before.” Budget bills are passed in accordance with a self-regulating process in Parliament during which MPs can raise the issues of concerns to the Plaintiffs. There are no facts pleaded to suggest that the Plaintiffs are not as fully represented in Parliament on budget bills as they are on any other bill.
[112]       As the House of Lords made clear in Hamilton v al Fayed, above:
Article 9 of Bill of Rights 1689 provides:
“That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.”
It is well established that article 9 does not of itself provide a comprehensive definition of parliamentary privilege. In Prebble v. Television New Zealand Ltd.[1995] 1 AC 321 at p. 332, I said:
“In addition to article 9 itself, there is a long line of authority which supports a wider principle, of which article 9 is merely one manifestation, viz. that the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their respective constitutional roles. So far as the courts are concerned they will not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or done within the walls of Parliament in performances of its legislative functions and protection of its established privileges: Burdett v. Abbott (1811) 14 East 1; Stockdale v. Hansard(1839) 9 Ad. & E.C. 1; Bradlaugh v. Gossett(1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271; Pickin v. British Railways Board [1974] AC 765; Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593. As Blackstone said in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 17th ed. (1830), vol. 1, p. 163: ‘the whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its origin from this one maxim, “that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere.”
[113]       This is confirmed by s 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s 4 of the Parliament of Canada Act. The privileges, immunities and powers of the Senate and House of Commons and their members are matters of self-definition and regulation by Parliament. In my view, the presentation, debate and passing of the federal budget allows for no role by the Courts. In the present case, no facts are pleaded to support a case that Parliament is not cognizant of the Minister’s methodology or the perspectives of the Plaintiffs, or is being blinded.
[114]       As far as the Constitution Act, 1867 and s 3 of the Charter are concerned, COMER, as an unincorporated association, has no electoral rights. As regards the individual Plaintiffs, there are no facts pleaded to suggest that they do not have effective representation in Parliament when it comes to budget bills. In Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),[1991] 2 SCR 158 at 1836, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what representation means:
Ours is a representative democracy. Each citizen is entitled to be represented in government. Representation comprehends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one’s grievances and concerns to the attention of one’s government representative…
[emphasis in original]
[115]       Representation does not mean that the Plaintiffs have a right to force Parliament to proceed in a way that better suits their view of the appropriate way to present and pass a budget, and they have not pleaded facts to show that any particular budget legislation has negatively impacted a legal right that they enjoy.
[116]       There is nothing in the Amended Claim to suggest that the individual Plaintiffs do not enjoy the same meaningful participation in the electoral process as any other Canadian voter. SeeFigueroa, above, at para 27. The Plaintiffs do not lack effective representation simply because budget bills are not presented and dealt with in accordance with their views of what they should or should not contain, and there is no suggestion that they lack a voice in the deliberations of government because they are unable to bring their grievances and concerns to the attention of the MPs who represent them. In my view, Constitutional and Charter protection cannot mean that individual voters have the right or the expectation that their views on the appropriate presentation and enactment of any particular piece of legislation will be followed by Parliament. This is not to say that voter concerns about the way that Parliament enacts legislation are not legitimate concerns. However, how Parliament proceeds is a matter of self-definition (see Authorson, above) unless, of course, there is some “overriding constitutional or self-imposed statutory or indoor prescription.” In my view, notwithstanding the able arguments of Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Plaintiffs do not plead anything in the Amended Claim to establish an overriding Constitutional prescription or a breach of s 3 of the Charter that could ground their claim for declaratory relief or damages for this aspect of their claim. The Plaintiffs don’t even attempt to litigate any particular budget legislation. They focus their claim instead upon the budget compilation and Parliamentary process itself, and I think the jurisprudence is clear that the Court simply cannot go there. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1688/89 also prevents the Court from entertaining any action against any member of Parliament which seeks to make them personally liable for acts done or things said in Parliament. SeeHamilton v al Fayed, above.
[117]       In my view, then, those allegations of the Amended Claim that raise the taxation issue and seek relief based upon the Constitution Act, 1867 and s 3 of the Charter, and the principle of no taxation without representation have to be struck because it is plain and obvious that they disclose no reasonable cause of action and have no reasonable prospect of success.

(2)               Bank Act Issues

[118]       The balance of the Amended Claim deals with alleged breaches of the Bank Act by the Minister of Finance and the Government of Canada. In its essentials, this aspect of the claim has not changed since I reviewed the Plaintiffs’ previous Amended Statement of Claim in April, 2014.
[119]       I think it is useful to bear in mind the grounds of the Defendants’ cross-appeal that the Federal Court of Appeal was asked to consider in January, 2015 and which it dismissed:
1.    The Judge erred in fact and law in finding that there are alleged breaches or issues in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Statement of Claim (“Claim”) that are justiciable;
2.    The judge erred in law by finding that s. 18 of theBank of Canada Act could not be interpreted in a motion to strike, but would require full legal argument on a full evidentiary record;
3.    The judge erred in law by finding that had the learned Prothonotary determined s. 18 of theBank of Canada Act to be a “legislative imperative” that the Claim would then become justiciable;
4.    The judge erred in law by finding that even if s. 18 of the Bank of Canada Act is permissive, that this does not dispose of the matter of justiciability;
5.    The judge erred in fact and in law by finding that the Claim does not require the Court to adjudicate and dictate competing policy choices and that objective legal criteria exist to measure the Plaintiffs’ allegations;
6.    The judge erred in law and in fact by characterizing the Claim as one which requires the Court to assess whether the Defendants have acted, and continue to act, in accordance with theBank of Canada Act and the Constitution;
7.    The judge erred in fact and in law by finding that relevant and material facts have actually been pleaded in the Claim in support of the declarations sought that the policies and actions allegedly pursued by the Defendants have not complied with the Bank of Canada Act and the Constitution;
8.    The judge erred in law in finding on a motion to strike that any allegations in the Claim of breach of statute and/or of constitutional obligations may be justiciable depending on whether the Plaintiffs can establish a reasonable cause of action though appropriate and future amendments;
[120]       It also has to be borne in mind that in my Order of April 24, 2014, I did not say that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed with their Bank Act claims. All I said was that the claims had to be struck in their entirely because, as they stood, they did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and had no prospect of success. The Federal Court of Appeal endorsed this position.
[121]       I concluded that the “full import of the Bank Act and what is required of Canada and those Minister and officials who act, or don’t act, in accordance with the Bank Act is at the heart of this dispute” (para 72) and that:
[76]        So, as regards the declaratory relief sought in this Claim, it is my view that the matters raised could be justiciable and appropriate for consideration by the Court.  Should the Plaintiffs stray across the line into policy, they will be controlled by the Court.  There is a difference between the Court declaring that the Government or the Governor, or the Minister, should pursue a particular policy and a declaration as to whether the policy or policies they have pursued are compliant with the Bank Act and the Constitution. The facts are pleaded on these issues. Subject to what I have to say about other aspects of the Claim, the Plaintiffs should be allowed to go forward, call their evidence, and attempt to make their case.  It cannot be said, in my view, that it is plain and obvious on the facts pleaded that the action cannot succeed as regards this aspect of the Claim.  And even if s.18 of the Bank Act is interpreted as purely permissive, that does not decide the issue raised in the Claim that Canada has obviated crucial aspects of the Bank Act and has subverted or abdicated constitutional obligations by making itself subservient to private international institutions.
[122]       I said the Bank Act claims could be justiciable and appropriate for consideration by the Court”(emphasis added) because the Plaintiffs do give their account of the socio-economic problems that arise from alleged breaches of the Bank Act and related constitutional principles. I concluded that this provided context for the alleged breaches in the claims because the Court needs to understand the Plaintiffs’ version of what is at stake and what flows from the alleged breaches:
[75]        The difficult boundary between what a court should and should not decide will arise time and again in a case like the present.  However, the issue is not whether the Court should mandate the Government and the Bank to adopt the economic positions espoused and advocated by the Plaintiffs.  Nor will the Court be deciding whether a particular policy is “financially or economically fallacious,” although this kind of accusation does appear in the Claim.  In my view, the Court is being asked to decide whether particular policies and acts are in accordance with the Bank Act and the Constitution.  If justiciability is a matter of “appropriateness,” then the Court is the appropriate forum to decide this kind of issue.  In fact, the Court does this all the time.  The Supreme Court of Canada has made in clear that the Parliament of Canada and the executive cannot abdicate their functions (see Wheat Board, above) and that the executive and other government actors and institutions are bound by constitutional norms.  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, above, and Khadr, above.
[123]       From a res judicata perspective, it has to be borne in mind that the portions of the claim related to the Bank Act were struck under Rule 221. My comments about justiciability – “could be justiciable and appropriate for consideration by the Court,” –not “are justiciable” simply went to Prothonotary Aalto’s findings that they were not justiciable because they involved matters of policy rather than law. I was simply pointing out that legal issues could be distinguished from policy issues, so that the Bank Act claims could become justiciable “subject to what I have to say about other aspects of the Claim….” And when I say the “facts are pleaded on these issues,” (para 76) the “issues” I am referring to are the facts that distinguish the law from policy. The Plaintiffs are right to point out that I thought the Bank Act claims could go forward, but this was subject to issues of jurisdiction and what I had to say about the other aspects of the claim, and the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed this reasoning and this approach to the claims.
[124]       The reason I said the Bank Act claims “could be justiciable and appropriate for consideration by the Court” is because, as drafted, these claims give rise to problems of jurisdiction and justiciability that the Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to resolve by way of amendments. Now that amendments have been made the Court has to decide whether the Plaintiffs have resolved these problems.
[125]       The grounds brought forward by the Defendants in the present Rule 221 motion, as well as the arguments of the Plaintiffs, have to be considered in light of what the Court has already ruled about the Bank Act claims and what the Federal Court of Appeal has endorsed.
[126]       The Plaintiffs fault the Defendants for again raising arguments on justiciability that the Court has already decided and the Federal Court of Appeal has endorsed. As a reading of my Order of April 24, 2014 shows, my conclusions on justiciability at that time were subject to serious reservations. I concluded that there were legal issues in the claims (breaches of the Bank Act and the Constitution) that the Court could deal with and that could be distinguished from the socio-economic policy assertions in the claims: “In my view, the Court is being asked to decide whether particular policies and acts are in accordance with the Bank Act and the Constitution. If justiciability is a matter of ‘appropriateness,’ then the Court is the appropriate forum to decide this kind of issue.”
[127]       I did not conclude, however, that the claims as drafted were sufficient to allow the Court to carry out this function (otherwise I would not have struck them under Rule 221), and I went on to point out that the Bank Act and related Constitutional claims had to be struck, and indicated what the Plaintiffs needed to do by way of amendment to allow the Court to consider the legal (as opposed to the socio-economic policy aspects) of the claims. It has to be borne in mind that I struck all of the claims and that the Federal Court of Appeal did not just endorse what I said about justiciability; it also endorsed my decision to strike all of the claims and my reasons for doing so. So the important issue before me at this juncture is not whether the Court could examine and rule on the legal aspects of the claims; the issue is whether the amendments are sufficient to allow the Court to do this, and whether they overcome the problems I identified that compelled me to strike all of the claims in 2014.
[128]       To be fair to both sides of this dispute, my Order of April 24, 2014 may sometimes confuse issues of jurisdiction and justiciability. The Federal Court of Appeal seemed to have no problem with this and, however these concerns should be characterized, I did set them out in some detail and I will discuss them here as I described them in my Order of April 24, 2014. The Defendants may not be entirely wrong when they characterize those problems as being about justiciability rather than jurisdiction.
[129]       In my Order of April 24, 2014, I went on to examine the jurisdictional problems that arose in the Amended Statement of Claim that was then before me:
[86]        As I have concluded that it is not plain and obvious that the breach of statutory and constitutional obligations and the declaratory relief sought is not justiciable, all I can do at this juncture is decide whether the Court has the jurisdiction to deal with this aspect of the Claim. If amendments are made to portions of the Claim that are struck, this issue may have to be re-visited.
[87]        At this stage in the proceedings, s. 17 of theFederal Courts Act appears sufficiently wide enough to give the Federal Court concurrent jurisdiction where relief is sought against the Crown. This doesn’t end the matter, of course, and the Defendants have asked the Court to examine and apply the ITO v Miida Electronics Inc, [1986] 1 SCR 752 at p. 766 [ITO], jurisdictional test.
[88]        Given the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Rasmussen v Breau, [1986] 2 FC 500 at para 12, to the effect that the Federal Courts Act only applies to the Crown eo nomine, and not to a statutory corporation acting as an agent for the Crown, it is difficult to see why the Bank should be named as a Defendant.  However, the main problem in the way of determining jurisdiction at this stage is that the Plaintiffs have yet to produce pleadings that adequately set out how any private or other interest has been affected by the alleged statutory and constitutional breaches. The Plaintiffs are asking the Court to declare that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct, and that breaches have occurred. This is akin to asking the Court for an advisory opinion, and I see nothing in the jurisprudence to suggest that the Court has the jurisdiction to provide this kind of ruling in the form of a declaration.
[89]        The Plaintiffs are extremely vague on this issue. They simply assert that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to issue declarations concerning statutes such as the Bank Act, and jurisdiction over federal public actors, tribunals and Ministers of the Crown. They say they have private rights to assert but, as yet, and given that the tort and Charter claims must be struck, I see no private rights at issue. In addition, they claim to be acting for “all other Canadians,” but, once again, they have yet to produce pleadings that adequately plead how the rights of “all other Canadians” have been impacted in a way that translates into the infringement of an individual or a collective right.  If the rights of all Canadians are impacted, then the individual Plaintiffs would be able to describe, in accordance with the rules that govern pleadings, how their individual rights have been breached, but they have, as yet, not been able to do this.
[90]        It seems to me that the fundamental problem of how the Plaintiffs can simply come to the Court and request declarations that their interpretations of the Bank Act and the Constitution are correct is the reason why they have attached tortious and Charter breaches to their Claim. They know that they need to show how individual rights have been infringed but, as of yet, they have not even set out in their pleadings how their own rights have been infringed, let alone the rights of “all other Canadians.”
[91]        This means that, in terms of the ITOprinciples, the Plaintiffs have yet to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament that the Court can entertain and rule on the Claim as presently constituted (i.e. simply declare that statutory and constitutional breaches have occurred without an adequate description in the pleadings of how a private right or interest has been affected and the grounds for a valid cause of action), and they have yet to cite an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes such a statutory grant of jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs do not have any specific rights under the legislation which they cite and they have provided no statutory or other framework for the exercise of any rights.  They may be able to do these things with appropriate amendments to the pleadings.  As yet, however, I cannot see how the Court acquires the jurisdiction to provide the declaratory relief that is sought.
[emphasis in original]
[130]       It seems to me that the Plaintiffs have not resolved these problems in the Amended Claim.
[131]       The Plaintiffs take a very forceful and wide view on the availability of declaratory relief and the Court’s jurisdiction to grant such relief. The Plaintiffs take the position that
any citizen has a constitutional right, subject to frivolous and vexatious or no jurisdiction of the Court, to bring a public interest issue to the Court.
[Transcript of Proceedings p 62, lines 25-27]
[132]       Even if I were to accept this broad approach to standing, I still have to decide the jurisdictional issue which I could not decide in April, 2014 for the reasons quoted above that were endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal, and which, to use the Plaintiffs’ own logic, I must accept as res judicata. I said that the Plaintiffs could not just ask the Court for an advisory opinion on these Bank Act issues because “I see nothing in the jurisprudence to suggest that the Court has the jurisdiction to provide this kind of ruling in the form of a declaration.” In retrospect, I might have characterized this as a justiciability issue but, in my view, the terminology doesn’t matter because I decided that the problem was that the Plaintiffs were asking for a free-standing declaration that amounted to an advisory opinion and the Court is not in the business of granting free-standing opinions.
[133]       The Plaintiffs’ position on this issue is as follows:
You have at paragraph 29 the ruling in Dunsmuir with respect to judicial review as a constitutional right. And Dunsmuir and other cases see judicial review writ large. It’s not the procedural avenue of judicial review by way of application as opposed to by way of action. Under section 17 this Court has ruled one can seek declaratory relief by way of action, and that is in my factum.
But if I can refer Your Lordship to paragraph 31, where I actually extract the portions from the Manitoba Métis case, and they are italicized and bolded at pages 242 and 243.
“Citing Thorsen, the Supreme Court of Canada in this case”, which is 2013 case,” states: ‘The constitutionality of legislation has always been a justiciable issue. The right of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by Parliament can be vindicated by declaration that legislation is invalid or that a public act is ultra vires.’”
That is paragraph 134 that is extracted. That is exactly what my clients seek with respect to the actions of the Minister of Finance and the resulting constitutional breach of their right to vote – of their right not to be taxed without effective representation by their MPs, because they’re blindfolded by the Minister of Finance and what he does not deliver, which is a constitutional requirement, we say.
And then over the page from paragraph 140, the Supreme Court states:
“The Courts are the guardians of the Constitution and cannot be barred by mere statutes from issuing a declaration on a fundamental constitutional matter. The principles of legality, constitutionally and the rule of law demand no less.”
And then the passage that really answers my friend at paragraph 143 of Manitoba Métis Federation – an Inc., by the way, a corporation brought the challenge.
“Furthermore, the remedy available under this analysis if of a limited nature. A declaration is a narrow remedy. It is available without a cause of action, and courts make declarations whether or not any consequential relief is available.”
That statutorily reproduced under rule 64 of the Federal Courts Act, My Lord, which is reproduced at paragraph 32 of my factum, and this court in Edwards, which is right below that, has ruled that the declaratory relief may be sought in an action under section 17, which was have done. And then which is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in Khadr and Thorsen.
[Transcript of Proceedings p 54 line 8 to p 55, line 28]
[134]       The Plaintiffs appear to be of the view that, as a think-tank, they can simply come to Court and ask the Court to declare that the Minister of Finance and the Government of Canada are required to do certain things under the Bank Act, and that they have abdicated their constitutional duties, and allowed international private entities to trump the interests of Canadians. COMER has no Constitutional or Charter rights to assert and the individual Plaintiffs are no differently situated from any other Canadian and have no demonstrable individual Constitutional and Charter rights to assert. In the Amended Claim, the Plaintiffs collectively remain a think-tank, seeking the Court’s endorsement of alleged Bank Act and Constitutional breaches related to the Bank Act and international institutions.
[135]       Having been given the opportunity to amend, there are still no material facts in the Amended Claim that link the impugned legislative scheme embodied in the Bank Act to an effect on themselves as Plaintiffs. Their argument is that freestanding declarations on the constitutionality of laws and legal authority are always available to any Canadian citizen.
[136]       Since my Order of April 24, 2014 was considered by the Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal has had occasion to consider and pronounce in some detail on what the Court can do with pleadings that contain freestanding requests for declaratory relief. In Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare), 2015 FCA 227 [Mancuso], the Federal Court of Appeal provided the following guidance:
[31]        The appellants allege that their action can nonetheless proceed to trial on the basis of the surviving paragraphs. It is not problematic, in their view, that there are no material facts in the statement of claim, including none that link the impugned scheme to an effect on themselves as plaintiffs. They base this argument on the proposition that freestanding declarations on the constitutionality of laws and legal authority are always available.
[32]        On this latter point, there is no doubt. Free-standing declarations of constitutionality can be granted: Canadian Transit Company v. Windsor (Corporation of the City), 2015 FCA 88. But the right to the remedy does not translate into licence to circumvent the rules of pleading. Even pure declarations of constitutional validity require sufficient material facts to be pleaded in support of the claim. Charter questions cannot be decided in a factual vacuum: Mackay v. Manitoba, above, nor can questions as to legislative competence under theConstitution Act, 1867 be decided without an adequate factual grounding, which must be set out in the statement of claim. This is particularly so when the effects of the impugned legislation are the subject of the attack: Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at p. 1099.
[33]        The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 46 articulated the pre-conditions to the grant of a declaratory remedy: jurisdiction over the claim and a real as opposed to a theoretical question in respect of which the person raising it has an interest.
[34]        Following Khadr, this Court in Canada(Indian Affairs) v. Daniels, 2014 FCA 101 (leave to appeal granted) at paras. 77-79 highlighted the danger posed by a generic, fact-free challenge to legislation – in other words, a failure to meet the second Khadrrequirement. Dawson JA noted that legislation may be valid in some instances, and unconstitutional when applied to other situations. A court must have a sense of a law’s reach in order to assess whether and by how much that reach exceeds the legislature’s vires. It cannot evaluate whether Parliament has exceeded the ambit of its legislative competence and had more than an incidental effect on matters reserved to the provinces without examining what its legislation actually does. Facts are necessary to define the contours of legislative and constitutional competence. In the present case, this danger is particularly acute; as the judge noted, the legislation at issue pertains to literally thousands of natural health supplements.
[35]        This is not new law. While the plaintiffs point to Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 for the proposition that there is a broad right to seek declaratory relief, Solosky also notes that there must be “a ‘real issue’ concerning the relative interests of each [party].” The Court cannot be satisfied that this requirement is met absent facts being pleaded which indicate what that real issue is and its nexus to the plaintiffs and their claim for relief.
[137]       In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not, in their Amended Claim, pleaded facts to demonstrate a “real” issue concerning the relative interests of each party, and the nexus of that real issue to the Plaintiffs and their claim for relief. Although as I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs do distinguish between legal issues and policy issues, the legal issues remain theoretical with no real nexus to some interest of the Plaintiffs, other than an interest in having the Court endorse their opinion on the Bank Act issues raised.
[138]       The Plaintiffs have not addressed the jurisdictional problems I referred to in paras 85 to 91 of my Order of April 24, 2014 and/or what might generally be referred to as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, or its willingness to grant, free-standing requests for declaration.
[139]       Apart from the taxation issues which I have concluded are not justiciable for reasons set out above, the Plaintiffs have made little attempt in their amendments to rectify the problems I raised in my Order of April 24, 2014. The declaratory relief related to the Bank Act remains the same. The damages claimed in 1(b)(ii) appear to be based upon s 3 of the Charter and the no taxation without representation principle, which I have found to be non-justiciable.
[140]       The Plaintiffs have urged me to treat my Order of April 24, 2014 and the Federal Court of Appeal decision on that judgement as res judicata. If I do this then I have to say that in their Amended Claim the Plaintiffs have still provided no legal or factual basis for the infringement of their private rights, and the declarations remain nothing more than a request that the Court provide an advisory opinion that supports their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read.
[141]       In order to overcome this problem in their first Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs hitched their declaratory relief to ss 7 and 15 of the Charter and various tort claims, all of which they have now abandoned. In their stead, they have now hitched the declaratory relief to claims based on s 3 of the Charter and Constitutional guarantees of no taxation without representation, which I have found to be non-justiciable. This leaves the Court in the same situation as it found itself in April, 2014:
[91]        This means that, in terms of the ITOprinciples, the Plaintiffs have yet to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament that the Court can entertain and rule on the Claim as presently constituted (i.e. simply declare that statutory and constitutional breaches have occurred without an adequate description in the pleadings of how a private right or interest has been affected and the grounds for a valid cause of action), and they have yet to cite an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes such a statutory grant of jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs do not have any specific rights under the legislation which they cite and they have provided no statutory or other framework for the exercise of any rights.  They may be able to do these things with appropriate amendments to the pleadings.  As yet, however, I cannot see how the Court acquires the jurisdiction to provide the declaratory relief that is sought.
[142]       It seems to me that the Federal Court of Appeal in Mancuso, above, has now made it clear that a claim for a pure declaration must establish through pleading sufficient material facts that the Court has jurisdiction over the claims “and a real as opposed to a theoretical question in respect of which the person raising has an interest.”
[143]       I do not wish to denigrate, or even downplay, the Plaintiffs’ concerns about the way that Parliament has dealt with economic and monetary issues. But not all concerns can be translated into legal action that can, or should, be dealt with by a court of law. Rather than supplement their previous ss 7 and 15 Charter claims, and their previous tort claims, the Plaintiffs have abandoned those claims altogether and have now come up with claims based upon s 3 of the Charter and Constitutional guarantees of no taxation without representation. As able as their arguments are, the sudden switch to a new game plan suggests that the Plaintiffs are not able to remove their concerns from the political realm and to characterize them in such a way that they can be dealt with by this Court.
[144]       It seems to me, then, that the latest Amended Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no prospect of success at trial. It also seems to me that the Plaintiffs are still asking the Court for an advisory opinion in the form of declarations that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct. It also seems to me that they have failed to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that this Court can entertain and rule on their claim as presently constituted, or that they have any specific rights under the legislation which they invoke, or a legal framework for any such rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out inOperation Dismantle, above, the preventive function of a declaratory judgment must be more than hypothetical and requires “a cognizable threat to a legal interest before the Court will entertain the use of its process as a preventative measure” (para 33). The Court is not here to declare the law generally or to give an advisory opinion. The Court is here to decide and declare contested legal rights. See Gouriet, above, at 501-502.

D.                Other issues

[145]       The Defendants have raised a number of other issues going to the adequacy and appropriateness of the Amended Claim but, in light of the fundamental problems I have dealt with above, I see no point in going any further with my analysis.

E.                 Leave to Amend

[146]       The Plaintiffs have asked the Court to consider, as an alternative form of relief, that they be allowed to proceed on the declaratory relief in their Amended Claim, with leave to amend any struck portions with respect to the damages portion of the claim.
[147]       As set out above, I do not think that, even for the declaratory relief sought, that the Plaintiffs have been able to raise their claim above a mere request for an advisory opinion. In addition, as further explained above, given that the Plaintiffs have not been able to rectify the fundamental issues I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, and have not suggested any way in which they could be rectified, I see no point in allowing an amendment. Having previously permitted the Plaintiffs such an opportunity, their response convinces me that, for reasons given, they have no scintilla of a cause of action that this Court can or should hear. Without having any real legal interest at stake, the Plaintiffs remain a think tank seeking to have the Court endorse their political and academic viewpoint. Amendments are not going to change this.


ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that
1.      The Plaintiffs’ latest Amended Claim is struck in its entirety;
2.      Leave to amend is refused;
3.      Costs are awarded to the Defendants.
“James Russell”
Judge


FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:
T-2010-11

STYLE OF CAUSE:
COMMITTEE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC REFORM (“COMER”), WILLIAM KREHM, AND ANN EMMETT v HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE, THE BANK OF CANADA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

PLACE OF HEARING:
TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING:
OCTOBER 14, 2015

ORDER AND REASONS:
RUSSELL J.

DATED:
FEBRUARY 8, 2016

APPEARANCES:
Rocco Galati
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

Peter Hajecek
FOR THE DEFENDANTS

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Rocco Galati Law Firm Professional Corporation
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

William F. Pentney
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE DEFENDANTS


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Date Modified: 2016-03-10

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Justice = Pax - Peace - Paz - Paix - Vrede - Frieden - Shalom - Salam - Mir - Pau - Pokoj - Shanti - Ashkharh...Abenaki OLAKAMIGENOKA Afrikaans VREDE Akan ASOMDWOE Akkadian SALMU Alabama ITTIMOKLA Albanês PAQE Algonquin WAKI IJIWEBISI Alsaciano FRIEDE Amharic SELAM Árabe SALAM Aranese PATZ Armenio ASHKHARH Assamese SHANTI Aymara HACANA Bemba MUTENDEN Basque (Euzkera) BAKEA Bavariano FRIDN Batak PARDAMEAN Belorusso PAKOJ Bengali SHANTI Bhojpuri SHANTI Isaïe 32, 17

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Politesse et étiquette

Les commentaires si possible signés, concis ou non, courtois et pertinents, même très critiques sont appréciés. Toute discussion peut être source de progrès. Les autres, surtout les vulgaires, pourraient être supprimés .

(c) Date de l'article, sinon 2000 Famille de Siebenthal, Lausanne, Suisse. 021 616 88 88

Sites que vous devriez visiter, merci

Saint Jean-Paul II a comparé le rapport sexuel entre les époux chrétiens à l'adoration eucharistique.

http://desiebenthal.blogspot.com/2011/05/le-rapport-sexuel-est-comparable.html


http://michaeljournal.org

http://ferraye.blogspot.com/

Un pour tous, tous pour un, IEOUA, LIOBA, Alleluia

Un pour tous, tous pour un, IEOUA, LIOBA, Alleluia
Image des rings burgondes

von Siebenthal

von Siebenthal
Signification des armoiries:chapelle de Gstaad, St Niklaus. Mettons le dragon qui est en chacun de nous sous 7 verrous. Meaning of the coat of arms: Chapel of Gstaad, St Niklaus. Let the dragon that is in each of us within 7 locks. http://desiebenthal.blogspot.ch/2015/12/misericordes-suisses.html

Un pour tous, tous pour un.

Un pour tous, tous pour un.
Le dragon de nos armoiries qui crache le feu sur le casque. http://desiebenthal.blogspot.ch/2015/12/misericordes-suisses.html

Les valeurs suisses

Les valeurs suisses
Un pour tous, tous pour un.

Archives du blog

Les sept verrous qui bloquent le dragon qui est en chacun d'entre nous.

On triomphe des 7 vices capitaux par l’exercice des 7 vertus opposées.

Ainsi on triomphe :

de l’orgueil par l’humilité,

de l’avarice par la libéralité,

de la luxure par la chasteté,

de la colère par la patience,

de la gourmandise par l’abstinence,

de l’envie par l’amour fraternel,

de la paresse par la diligence et l’ardeur dans le service de Dieu.

Un combat à la fois, un par jour est plus efficace.

Sagesse de la première Alliance...Isaïe 11.1-3

Un rejeton sortira de la souche de Jessé,
un surgeon poussera de ses racines.
Sur lui reposera l’Esprit du Seigneur,
esprit de sagesse et d’intelligence,
esprit de conseil et de force,
esprit de connaissance et de crainte du Seigneur
son inspiration est dans la crainte [piété] du Seigneur.


ll y a sept dons du Saint-Esprit qui nous aident dans ce combat :

1 le don de Sagesse ;

2 d’Intelligence ;

3 de Conseil ;

4 de Force ;

5 de Science ;

6 de Piété ;

7 de Crainte de Dieu.

A quoi servent les 7 dons du Saint-Esprit ?

Les 7 dons du Saint-Esprit servent à nous confirmer dans la Foi, l’Espérance et la Charité ; et à nous rendre prompts aux actes de vertu nécessaires pour acquérir la vie chrétienne et le CIEL.

Qu’est-ce que la Sagesse ?

La Sagesse est un don par lequel, élevant notre esprit au-dessus des choses terrestres et fragiles, nous contemplons les choses éternelles, c’est-à-dire la Vérité qui est Dieu, en qui nous nous complaisons et que nous aimons comme notre souverain Bien.

Qu’est-ce que l’Intelligence ?

L’Intelligence est un don par lequel nous est facilitée, autant que c’est possible pour un homme mortel, l’intelligence de la Foi et des divins mystères que nous ne pouvons connaître par les lumières naturelles de notre esprit.

Qu’est-ce que le Conseil ?

Le Conseil est un don par lequel, dans les doutes et les incertitudes de la vie humaine, nous connaissons ce qui contribue le plus à la gloire de Dieu, à notre salut et à celui du prochain.

Qu’est-ce que la Force ?

La Force est un don qui nous inspire de l’énergie et du courage pour observer fidèlement la sainte loi de Dieu et de l’Eglise, en surmontant tous les obstacles et toutes les attaques de nos ennemis.

Qu’est-ce que la Science ?

La Science est un don par lequel nous apprécions sainement les choses créées, et nous connaissons la manière d’en bien user et de les diriger vers leur fin dernière qui est Dieu.

Qu’est-ce que la Piété ?

La Piété est un don par lequel nous vénérons et nous aimons Dieu et les Saints, et nous avons des sentiments de miséricorde et de bienveillance envers le prochain pour l’amour de Dieu.

Qu’est-ce que la Crainte de Dieu ?

La Crainte de Dieu est un don qui nous fait respecter Dieu et craindre d’offenser sa divine Majesté, et qui nous détourne du mal en nous portant au bien dans l'amour.


Les dons du Saint Esprit
(CEC 1830-1831 ; ST I-II 68.1-8)


Les dons sont des habitudes, habitus infus, qui sont en nous et qui nous rendent réceptifs aux motions du Saint-Esprit, pour nous faire mieux agir en faveur du bien commun.

« Les dons sont des habitus qui perfectionnent l’homme pour qu’il suive promptement l’impulsion du Saint-Esprit, de même que les vertus morales disposent les facultés appétitives à obéir à la raison. Or, de même qu’il est naturel pour les facultés appétitives d’être mues par le commandement de la raison ; de même il est naturel pour toutes les facultés humaines d’être mues par l’impulsion de Dieu comme par une puissance supérieure. » ST I-II 68.4

Les sept dons du Saint Esprit
(ST I-II 68.4)


Intelligence : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans l’appréhension, par l’intelligence, des vérités spéculatives (ST II-II 8.1-8).
Conseil : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans l’appréhension, par l’intelligence, des vérités pratiques (ST II-II 52.1-4).
Sagesse : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans le jugement, par l’intelligence, des vérités spéculatives (ST II-II 45.1-6).
Connaissance : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans le jugement, par l’intelligence, des vérités pratiques (ST II-II 9.1-4).
Piété : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans les appétits de l’amour des choses qui concernent un autre (ST II-II 121.1-2).
Force : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans les appétits de la crainte des choses qui nous concernent (ST II-II 138.1-2).
Crainte : nous rend réceptifs à l’action de l’Esprit Saint dans les appétits du désir des choses nous concernant (ST II-II 19.1-12).

http://www.lumenc.org/maladies.php

Les conseils du pape François pour se confesser

© POOL-OR/CPP/CIRIC

© POOL-OR/CPP/CIRIC

Dans un petit livret intitulé « Prends soin de ton cœur », offert par le pape François aux pèlerins de la place Saint Pierre après l'Angelus du 22 février, se trouvent différents textes à méditer pendant le carême et un examen de conscience pour se préparer à la confession.

  • Une distribution un peu particulière a eu lieu il y a quelques jours place Saint-Pierre, à Rome. Des bénévoles, parmi lesquels de nombreux sans-abri venus en pèlerinage, ont distribué à la foule réunie pour entendre l'Angelus un petit carnet offert par le pape pour le premier dimanche du carême.
  • Notre cœur doit se convertir au Seigneur, a insisté François lors de l'Angélus. C’est pourquoi, en ce premier dimanche, j’ai pensé vous offrir, à vous qui êtes ici sur la place, un petit livret de poche intitulé "Prends soin de ton cœur". »

Celui-ci rassemble quelques enseignements de Jésus et les contenus essentiels de la foi, comme les sept sacrements, les dons de l'Esprit Saint, les dix commandements, les vertus, les œuvres de miséricorde, etc. On y trouve aussi un examen de conscience dont le pape avait souligné l'importance lors de sa messe quotidienne à la chapelle de la maison Sainte-Marthe le 11 octobre 2014. « Avoir un cœur recueilli, un cœur dans lequel nous savons ce qui se passe et ici et là, nous pouvons exercer une pratique ancienne mais efficace de l’Église : l’examen de conscience. Qui d’entre nous, le soir, avant de finir sa journée, reste tout seul ou toute seule et se pose la question : qu’est-ce qui s’est passé aujourd’hui dans mon cœur ? Qu’est-il arrivé ? Quelles émotions ont traversé mon cœur ? Si nous ne faisons pas cela, nous ne réussissons pas ni à bien veiller ni à bien protéger notre cœur »

I. Petits rappels sur le sacrement de Confession (ou de Pénitence ou de Réconciliation)

Un vrai chrétien a le souci constant de conserver son âme en état de grâce aux yeux de Dieu. Il sait, en effet, d’une part, que nul ne connaît ni le jour ni l’heure de sa mort et que, d’autre part, l’âme, pour être admise au bonheur parfait et éternel du Ciel, doit être entiè­rement purifiée du péché. C’est pourquoi il reçoit volontiers le sacrement de la Réconciliation.

Par ce sacrement, on obtient la rémission de tous les péchés person­nels (quelle qu’en soit la gravité) commis après le baptême. Ce pouvoir qu’avait le Christ, il l’a transmis à ses Apôtres quand, leur apparaissant après sa Résurrection, il leur a dit : Recevez le Saint-Esprit : les péchés seront remis à ceux à qui vous les remettrez ; ils seront retenus à ceux à qui vous les retiendrez (Jean, XX, 23). Ce pouvoir passa des Apôtres à leurs successeurs.


Tout chrétien doit recevoir ce sacrement au moins une fois chaque année. Il comporte :

L’examen des fautes commises.
Le regret de les avoir commises (Contrition).
La résolution sincère de les éviter à l’avenir.
L’accusation des péchés, au moins graves, à un prêtre approuvé, tenant la place de Dieu.
L’absolution donnée par le prêtre au nom de Jésus-Christ.
L’accomplissement de la pénitence qu’il a imposée (Satisfaction).


Le sacrement de pénitence produit notre propre mort au péché et notre résurrection à la vie en Dieu. Il prolonge ainsi notre baptême et nous prépare à l’eucharistie. Il doit laisser dans nos âmes une immense joie, car c’est un sacrement de vie.


II. Quelques conseils pour bien réaliser son examen de conscience

Par une courte prière, demander à Dieu et à Notre-Dame la grâce de bien connaître les péchés dont on est coupable.

S’examiner sur les Commandements de Dieu et de l’Église ; les péchés capitaux ; les devoirs de son état.

Pour aider le plus d’âmes possible, dont les besoins sont très divers, l’examen proposé ci-après est plutôt détaillé. Mais il est rappelé qu’en confession seule l’accusation des péchés mortels est obligatoire. Un péché est mortel quand, sachant pleinement que la matière en était grave, on l’a néanmoins commis avec un entier consentement. C’est alors une rupture d’amour avec Dieu. Et comme l’âme cesse ainsi d’être unie à Dieu - de qui elle tenait sa vie -, elle meurt surna­turellement : le péché a été "mortel" pour elle.

L’examen terminé, demander instamment à Dieu, par l’intercession de la Vierge Marie, la grâce d’une vraie contrition des péchés com­mis et la ferme résolution de les éviter à l’avenir, conditions indispen­sables pour obtenir le pardon de ses péchés.

Pour exciter en soi le regret de ses fautes, réfléchir durant quelques instants :

au redoutable châtiment du purgatoire ou de l’enfer que l’on a mérité ;
aux souffrances et à la mort que Jésus-Christ endura pour l’expiation de nos péchés ;
à la bonté d’un Dieu d’amour et de miséricorde, offensé par le péché qui a produit une rupture profonde, surtout s’il a été mortel.

Puis, réciter lentement l’acte de contrition.

III. Quelques conseils pour recevoir le sacrement lui-même

Avant de rentrer au confessionnal, ou immédiatement en entrant, suivant la coutume, réciter le « Je confesse à Dieu… » LeConfiteor nous remet devant cette réalité du péché et nous fait accomplir le mouvement de « conver­sion » nécessaire, vers Dieu et vers les autres :

Parce que nous nous sommes opposés à l’Amour tout-puissant, en cherchant à réaliser notre bonheur contre Lui ou sans Lui, nous disons : « Je confesse à Dieu tout-puissant » ;

Parce que nous avons porté atteinte à l’œuvre de l’Incarnation et de la Rédemption, en nous séparant de tous ceux qui ont coopéré à cette œuvre, notamment de la Mère du Christ, nous disons : « Je confesse … à la Bienheureuse Marie toujours Vierge » ;

Parce que nous nous sommes opposés à l’œuvre de lutte et de fidélité des anges, l’attente des martyrs, des prophètes de l’Ancien Testament, morts pour que le Règne du Messie se réalise, à l’œuvre des apôtres et des saints qui ont travaillé pour le Christ, nous disons : « Je confesse… à saint Michel (vainqueur du démon), à saint Jean Baptiste (dernier des pro­phètes), aux apôtres (représentés par saint Pierre et saint Paul), et à tous les saints » ;

Enfin, parce que notre péché s’est opposé à toute l’Église et nous sépare des autres membres du Corps Mystique que le prêtre représente, en même temps qu’il tient la place de Jésus Christ, nous disons : « Je confesse… à vous, mon Père… ».


Avant de commencer l’énumération des péchés, préciser : le temps écoulé depuis la dernière confession ; un oubli ou une dissimulation de péché grave dans celle-ci ; une ou plusieurs mauvaises communions (en état de péché grave) ; une omission de la pénitence donnée (volontaire ou non).


Accuser sincèrement tous les péchés mortels que l’on a commis, avec leur nombre et les circonstances qui les ont modifiés (aggravés, allégés), comme par exemple, les péchés commis avec d’autres personnes qu’on a ainsi scandalisées, ou qu’on a entraîné au péché.

L’accusation des péchés véniels n’est pas indispensable car on peut en obtenir le pardon par d’autres moyens que la confession, par exemple la prière, l’aumône, la pénitence… Pourtant, cette accusation est fort conseillée car, par le sacrement de la Confession, on obtient des grâces spéciales pour éviter ces péchés véniels à l’avenir.

Dans le cadre de confessions régulières, on peut dire où l’on en est par rapport à son défaut dominant, ou par rapport à ses résolutions.

Si l’on est troublé ou que l’on a peur, ou tout simplement si on hésite, on peut demander au prêtre de nous interroger, ou de nous renseigner sur la gravité d’un péché.

Terminer par : « Je m’accuse de tous ces péchés, de tous ceux que j’aurais pu avoir oublié et de tous ceux de ma vie passée ; j’en demande très humblement pardon à Dieu, et à vous mon Père, pénitence et absolution si vous m’en jugez digne ».


Ecouter avec attention le mot d'exhortation du prêtre. Avant l'absolution, bien regretter ses péchés, et réciter à cet effet l'acte de contrition : « Mon Dieu, j'ai un très grand regret de Vous avoir offensé, parce que Vous êtes infiniment bon, infiniment aimable et que le péché Vous déplaît. Je prends la ferme résolution avec le secours de Votre sainte grâce de ne plus Vous offenser et de faire pénitence. »


Après la confession, accomplir la pénitence imposée par le confesseur au plus tôt, afin de ne pas l’oublier ; remercier Dieu du pardon obtenu ; renouveler sa résolution d’éviter tout péché à l’avenir, surtout le péché grave.


Examen de conscience détaillé

Avant de commencer cet examen, adresser à Dieu cette prière :

Mon Dieu, je vous supplie, par l’intercession de la Vierge Marie, de m’accorder la grâce de bien connaître tous les péchés dont je suis coupable. Faites qu’ensuite je m’en accuse avec un sincère regret de les avoir commis et une ferme volonté de les éviter à l’avenir et qu’ainsi j’en obtienne le pardon de votre miséricorde infinie. Ainsi soit-il.


Examen sur les commandements de Dieu

1er Commandement : « Tu adoreras Dieu seul et l’aimeras plus que tout… »

Omission de la prière (en particulier le matin et le soir), de la fré­quentation des sacrements de la Pénitence et de l’Eucharistie… Communions ou confessions sacrilèges… Manque de respect des sacrements… Manque au jeûne avant la communion (une heure au moins)… Violation du secret de confession… Doutes volontaires contre la foi… Mise en péril de la foi par la lecture de journaux impies, par des fréquentations dangereuses… Respect humain… Manque de confiance en Dieu ou confiance présomptueuse en ses propres forces… Indifférence à l’égard de Dieu… Manque de soumission à la volonté de Dieu… Pratiques superstitieuses, spiritisme… Critiques de la religion… Adhésion à des mouvements incompatibles avec la foi catholique… Négligence dans sa formation chrétienne…


2ème Commandement : « Tu ne prononceras le nom de Dieu qu’avec respect… »

Emploi inutile du nom de Dieu… Blasphèmes, imprécations, jurons… Serments faux ou inutiles… Irrespect à l’égard des personnes et des choses consacrées à Dieu… Souhaits néfastes à l’égard de soi-même ou d’autrui… Non-accomplissement des vœux émis…


3ème Commandement : « Tu sanctifieras le jour du Seigneur… »

Omission volontaire ou sans motif de l’assistance à la Messe domini­cale ou des fêtes d’obligation… Retard volontaire ou dissipation durant ces Messes… Travail fait ou ordonné sans nécessité ou permission… Recherches de distractions contraires à la sanctification du dimanche…


4ème Commandement : « Tu honoreras ton père et ta mère… »

Manque d’amour, d’affection, de respect, d’obéissance, d’assistance à l’égard des parents durant leur vie et de prière à leur intention après leur mort… Peine causée… Souhaits de mal… Disputes d’intérêt en famille… Manque de déférence et de soumission à l’égard des supérieurs…

Pour les parents à l’égard de leurs enfants : négligence dans leur édu­cation chrétienne ou leur pratique religieuse, mauvais exemples donnés, manque de surveillance, de soins, de disponibilité, de conseils ou de corrections nécessaire… Dureté, injustice, sévérité excessive…


5ème Commandement : « Tu ne tueras point… »

Meurtre, tentative de suicide, euthanasie… Avortements, stérilisations… Souhait de mort ou de malheur à l’égard d’autrui… Vengeance, coups, blessures, torts causés à la santé, drogues, alcool, mutilations… Insultes, injures, mépris, faux rapports, haine, violences, refus de pardonner, vengeances… Indifférence à la peine d’autrui… Scan­dales par mauvais exemples, par conseils ou approbation silen­cieuse…


6ème et 9ème Commandements : « Tu ne feras pas d’impureté… » et « Tu n’auras pas de désir impur volontaire… »

Pensées ou désirs impurs provoqués en soi ou chez les autres… Conversations, chansons, lectures, spectacles immoraux (TV, Internet…) Flirts… Familiarités coupables… Danses lascives… Touchers indécents… Actions contraires à la chasteté, seul ou avec d’autres : masturbation, relations charnelles en dehors du mariage, homosexualité… Tenues ou attitudes provocantes…

Pour les fiancés : Légèretés, tendresses excessivement sensuelles… Relations prématrimoniales… Cohabitation…

Pour les époux : Atteintes coupables à la fécondité du mariage, contraception permanente ou temporaire… Limitation de l’usage du mariage aux jours inféconds sans cause sérieuse… Adultère (pensées, désirs, actions)… Liaisons… Divorce… Remariage civil… Refus injuste du droit du conjoint…


7ème et 10ème Commandements : « Tu ne voleras pas… » et « Tu ne désireras pas injustement le bien d’autrui… »

Vol (quoi ? combien ? circonstances ?), recel, objets trouvés ou empruntés et non rendus… Dommages injustes causés au prochain dans ses biens… Fraudes, manœuvres déloyales dans le travail, les affaires, le commerce, les contrats… Pots-de-vin… Coopération à des injustices… Recel d’objets volés… Négligence dans le paiement des dettes… Salaires insuffisants… Exploitation des faibles… Dommages aux biens collectifs… Désirs de vol ou d’injustices… Non-réparation de dommages causés… Non-restitution… Gaspillage… Travail bâclé…


8ème Commandement : « Tu ne mentiras pas… »

Mensonges avec ou sans préjudice pour autrui… Médisances ou calom­nies, faites ou approuvées… Faux témoignages en justice… Accusations injustes… Jugements téméraires… Rapports injustes nuisibles… Violation du secret, confié ou professionnel, des correspondances… Dissimulation, hypocrisie… Tricheries… Promesses non tenues… Refus de rectifier la vérité…


Examen sur les commandements de l’Église

Tu sanctifieras les fêtes d’obligation (Noël, Ascension, Assomption, Toussaint).

Tu assisteras à la messe les dimanches et fêtes d’obligation.

Tu te confesseras au moins une fois l’an.

Tu communieras chaque année au Temps pascal.

Tu jeûneras les jours fixés par l’Église (Mercredi des Cendres et Vendredi Saint).

Tu ne mangeras pas de viande les jours fixés par l’Église (c’est-à-dire, les jours de jeûne et les vendredis de Carême). Pour les autres vendredis de l’année, cette abstinence peut être remplacée par une autre forme de pénitence (qu’il faut alors accomplir sous peine de péché).


Examen sur les péchés capitaux

ORGUEIL : Amour-propre désordonné… Complaisance en soi-même… Egoïsme… Ambition démesurée… Vanité mondaine… Présomption… Attitudes hautaines, susceptibilité…

AVARICE : Vices contraires aux 7ème et 10ème commandements. Refus de partager, d’aider ceux qui sont dans le besoin (aumône) …

LUXURE : Vices contraires aux 6ème et 9ème commandements.

ENVIE : Jalousie du bonheur, des biens, des succès des autres ; joie de leurs malheurs, de leurs misères, de leurs revers…

GOURMANDISE : Excès dans le manger, le boire… Ivrognerie… Sensualité… Ivresse des stupéfiants…

COLÈRE : Manque de maîtrise de soi, emportements, rancunes, res­sentiment, murmures, bouderie, brusquerie, grossièreté, cruauté…

PARESSE : Dans le lever, le travail, les prières… Oisiveté… Fuite systématique des efforts…


Examen sur les devoirs d’état

N.B. L’examen suivant est très détaillé, et reprend en partie ce qui a déjà été vu auparavant.


Alors qu’il est très important, c’est un domaine qu’on oublie souvent dans l’examen de la conscience. Selon son état de vie et ses responsabilités :


1. Devoirs personnels de chrétiens :

Quelle importance ai-je attaché à ma vie chrétienne, au milieu de toutes mes occupations ? A-t-elle la première place ? Y a-t-il dans ma vie une cohérence entre ma foi et mes œuvres ?

Est-ce que je crois à la présence et à l’action du Seigneur dans le monde et dans ma vie de chaque jour ? Ai-je cherché à mieux connaître sa pensée et sa volonté en face des événements, en face des autres, et de mes problèmes personnels ? Suis-je fidèle à la vocation que Dieu m’a envoyée ?

Ai-je cherché à grandir dans la foi, à approfondir ma connaissance du Sei­gneur par la lecture de l’Évangile et du Catéchisme, ou par tout autre moyen mis à ma disposition : retraites, cours, prédications… ?

Ai-je eu peur de témoigner de ma foi par lâcheté, respect humain ? N’ai-je pas cédé aux doutes, à l’inquiétude, à l’angoisse, au désespoir ?

Ai-je compté sur le Seigneur dans les difficultés et dans les tentations ?

Est-ce que je vis dans l’attente de la vie éternelle ?

Ai-je prié ? Régulièrement ? Avec mon cœur ? Avec toute ma vie ?

Ai-je pris part à la Sainte Messe quand l’Église me le demande ? Y ai-je participé de mon mieux ?

Ai-je vécu le dimanche comme un jour de prière et de joie ? N’ai-je pas accom­pli des travaux qui ne sont pas conformes à cet esprit ?

Ai-je fait quelque chose pour aider la mission d’évangélisation de l’Église ? Pour ramener mes connaissances à la vraie foi ?

N’ai-je pas refusé par souci de ma tranquillité ou par égoïsme de m’engager dans un mouvement d’Église ?

Ai-je collaboré loyalement avec les prêtres de l’Église ? Les ai-je aidé autant que je pouvais ?


2. Devoirs envers le prochain :

Est-ce que j’aime le prochain d’un amour vrai et efficace ?

La misère, les souffrances des autres sont-elles pour moi une préoccupation ? Ai-je fait mon possible pour les sou­lager ?

Ai-je cherché à comprendre les autres ? Ai-je cherché à les aider en mettant à leur disposition mon amitié, mon temps, mes biens ?

N’ai-je jamais blessé les autres par mes paroles, mes gestes ?

Ai-je risqué de porter atteinte à la vie des autres ou à la mienne, par des im­prudences dans le travail, le sport ou sur la route ?

En quoi ai-je pu trahir l’amour des autres : indifférence, oubli des autres, mise à l’écart de certains, mauvais caractère, volonté d’avoir raison à tout prix, jalousie, envie, désir de vengeance, mépris, jugement téméraire, haine, rail­lerie, médisance, calomnie, secrets ré­vélés, achats ou ventes à des prix injustes, dettes impayées, choses non rendues, gaspillage ou détérioration des biens collectifs, mauvais exemple, scan­dale d’autant plus grand qu’il vient d’un témoin du Christ, refus de pardonner.


3. Devoirs familiaux :

Enfants :

Ai-je vraiment aimé mes parents, en évitant d’augmenter leurs difficultés, en leur apportant mon concours, en leur manifestant mon affection ?

Ai-je respecté mes parents ? En leur parlant avec déférence, en ne les jugeant pas sans les comprendre ?

Ai-je respecté l’autorité de mes parents en écoutant leurs conseils, leurs ordres et en les exécutant de mon mieux ?

N’ai-je pas gêné l’atmosphère familiale par de la mauvaise humeur, de la bouderie, de la révolte ?

Est-ce que j’aide de mon mieux mes parents âgés quand ils sont dans la gêne, ou malades ou isolés ?

Est-ce que je cherche à bien m’entendre avec tous les membres de ma famille ?


Personnes mariées :

Suis-je fidèle à l’amour promis le jour du mariage ? Ai-je cherché à développer cet amour, à me donner sans réserve et à me sacrifier ?

Ai-je souci des désirs, des goûts, des difficultés de mon époux ou de mon épouse ?

N’ai-je pas négligé mon foyer ? Ai-je le souci de penser à deux les pro­blèmes de ma famille ?

N’ai-je pas gâché notre amour en ne maîtrisant pas suffisamment les défauts de mon caractère ?

N’ai-je pas recherché les joies du mariage par simple égoïsme ?

La communion des cœurs et des esprits l’emporte-t-elle et anime-t-elle celle des corps ?

N’ai-je pas par égoïsme refusé d’avoir des enfants ? Ai-je dans ce but utilisé des moyens défendus ?

Est-ce que j’apporte toute l’attention voulue à l’éducation de mes enfants ?

Est-ce que je cherche à les connaître, à les comprendre, à découvrir leurs goûts, leur vocation, à suivre leur évolution quand ils grandissent ?

Ai-je pensé à leur donner le moyen d’exercer leur liberté quand ils grandissent ?

Mon attitude envers eux ne manque-t-elle pas de fermeté ou au contraire d’affection et de confiance ?

Est-ce que je leur donne le bon exemple ?

Ai-je cherché à les éduquer religieusement ? Leur ai-je donné le sens de la prière ?

Ai-je cherché à garder au foyer le sens du jour du Seigneur ? Ai-je aidé mes enfants à préparer leur messe ?

Ai-je considéré comme un honneur et un devoir de donner à Dieu des prêtres, des religieuses ?

Notre foyer est-il accueillant pour les autres ?


4. Devoirs professionnels :

Enfants :

Ai-je manqué l’école par ma faute ?

Ai-je mal étudié mes leçons, mal fait mes devoirs ?

Ai-je triché en classe (copié, soufflé) ?


Adultes :

Ai-je négligé mon travail ?

Ai-je conscience des responsabilités qu’engage ma situation, mon rôle ?

Quelle est mon attitude à l’égard de ceux qui me dirigent ? N’ai-je pas cherché, par méchanceté ou jalousie, à miner leur autorité ?

Quelle est mon attitude vis à vis de ceux qui travaillent avec moi ? N’ai-je pas tendance à me décharger sur les autres de ma tâche ? Est-ce que je sais les aider, les soutenir, entretenir avec eux des relations de bonne camaraderie ?

Ai-je pris ma place dans les organisa­tions professionnelles ?

Quelle est mon attitude vis à vis de ceux que je commande ou que j’emploie ? Est-ce que je les rétribue conformément à la justice ? Les ai-je traité humainement, en res­pectant leur dignité d’hommes ? Ne leur ai-je pas confié des tâches au-dessus de leurs forces ? Leur ai-je accordé le repos auquel ils ont droit et dont ils ont besoin ?


5. Devoirs civiques :

Ai-je rempli mes devoirs de chrétien dans la société ?

Ai-je cherché à m’informer le mieux possible pour comprendre les pro­blèmes sociaux et économiques ? A découvrir les solutions justes et efficaces ?

Ai-je le souci de tenir ma place dans la vie de la cité ou de la nation pour lui donner une meilleure orienta­tion ? Ai-je su accepter les charges mu­nicipales ou autres en les envisageant comme un service ?

Ai-je choisi mes représentants en fonc­tion de leur aptitude à promouvoir le bien commun et la loi divine plutôt qu’en fonction de leur aptitude à défendre mes intérêts ?

Ai-je fait mon possible pour faire changer les lois injustes (Avortements, divorce, euthanasie, pacs, etc.) ?

Examen de conscience pour Adultes

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Je crois en un Sauveur aimant qui pardonne mes péchés et qui me donne la grâce de devenir un Saint. Par le ministère de ses Prêtres, Jésus–Christ accomplit l’un et l’autre dans le Sacrement de Pénitence.

"Comme le Père M’a envoyé, Moi aussi Je vous envoie … Recevez le Saint Esprit. Les péchés seront pardonnés à qui vous les pardonnerez ils seront retenus à qui vous les retiendrez." (Jean XX : 21-23)

"Vos péchés seraient-ils rouges comme l’écarlate, ils deviendront blancs comme la neige." (Isaie I : 18)

"Je ne suis pas venu appeler les justes, mais les pécheurs." ( Matt. IX : 13)

"Les hommes ont reçu de Dieu un pouvoir accordé ni aux Anges,ni aux Archanges. Jamais il n’a dit aux Esprits Célestes « Tout ce que vous lierez et délierez sur la terre sera lié et délié dans le ciel ». Les Princes de ce monde peuvent seulement lier et délier le corps. Le pouvoir du prêtre va plus loin, il atteint l’âme et elle est exorcisée non seulement par le baptême, mais encore plus par le pardon des péchés. Ne rougissons donc pas de confesser nos fautes. Celui qui rougit de découvrir ses péchés à un homme et qui ne se confesse pas, sera couvert de honte au Jour du Jugement en présence de tout l’univers," (St Jean Chrysostome, Traité sur les prêtres, Livre 3)

Prière avant la confession: O Seigneur, accordez-moi la lumière pour que je me voie comme Vous me voyez, et le grâce de regretter vraiment et effectivement mes péchés. O Marie, aidez-moi à faire une bonne confession.

Comment se confesser: D’abord, examinez bien votre conscience, puis dites au prêtre le genre précis de péchés que vous avez commis et dans la mesure du possible, combien de fois vous les avez commis depuis votre dernière bonne confession. Il n’est obligatoire de confesser que les péchés mortels puisqu’on peut obtenir le pardon des péchés véniels par les sacrifices et les actes de charité. Si vous n’avez pas la certitude qu’un péché soit mortel ou véniel, mentionnez votre doute au confesseur. Souvenez-vous aussi que la confession de péchés véniels aide à éviter le péché et à progresser vers le Ciel.

Conditions nécessaires pour qu’un péché soit mortel:

Matière grave
Pleine connaissance
Entier consentement de la volonté.

Considérations préliminaires:

Ai-je parfois omis de confesser un péché grave dans le passé ; ou ai-je volontairement déguisé ou caché un tel péché ?
Nota bene : Cacher des péchés rend invalide la confession .
La confession est secrète, c’est à dire que c’est une faute mortelle pour le prêtre de révéler à qui que ce soit l’objet d’une confession.
Ai-je été coupable d’irrévérence envers ce sacrement en omettant d’examiner ma conscience avec soin?
Ai-je négligé de faire la pénitence donnée par le prêtre?
Ai-je des habitudes de péchés graves à confesser d’abord (par exemple: impureté, ivrognerie, etc.)

Premier Commandement:

Je suis le Seigneur Ton Dieu. Tu n’auras pas des dieux étrangers devant Moi. (y compris les péchés contre la Foi, l’Espérance et la Charité)

L'amour de l'argent est la racine de tous les maux, c'est une idolâtrie...

Ai-je négligé de connaître ma foi selon l’enseignement du catéchisme, par exemple le Symbole des Apôtres, les Dix Commandements, les Sept Sacrements, le Notre Père, etc.?
Ai-je volontairement mis en doute ou renié l’un des enseignements de l’Eglise?
Ai-je pris part à quelque culte non- catholique?
Suis-je membre de quelque organisation religieuse non-catholique, société secrète ou groupe anti-catholique?
Ai-je, en toute connaissance, lu quelque littérature hérétique, blasphématoire ou anti catholique?
Ai-je pratiqué des superstitions (telles que les horoscopes, prédiction d’avenir, spiritisme, etc.)
Ai-je omis des obligations ou pratiques religieuses pour des motifs de respect humain?
Me suis-je recommandé chaque jour à Dieu?
Ai-je été fidèle à mes prières quotidiennes?
Ai-je fait mauvais usage des Sacrements? Les ai-je reçus sans respect (par exemple la Communion dans la main) ou de manière invalide?
Me suis-je moqué de Dieu, de Notre-Dame, des Saints, de l’Eglise, des Sacrements ou d’autres sujets sacrés?
Ai-je été coupable de grande irrévérence dans l’Eglise (par exemple: conversation, comportement ou vêtement)?
Ai-je été indifférent vis-à-vis de ma foi catholique – en croyant qu’on peut se sauver dans n’importe quelle religion, que toutes les religions se valent?
Ai-je présumé de la miséricorde de Dieu en toute circonstance?
Ai-je désespéré de la miséricorde de Dieu?
Ai-je trahi Dieu?
Ai-je donné trop d’importance à quelque créature, activité, objet ou opinion?

Deuxième Commandement:

Tu ne prendras pas en vain le Nom du Seigneur Ton Dieu.

Ai-je blasphémé le Nom de Dieu à tort, inconsidérément ou en matière légère et triviale?
Ai-je murmuré ou gémi contre Dieu (blasphème)?
Ai-je prononcé des malédictions contre moi-même ou les autres, ou toute créature?
Me suis-je emporté contre les autres jusqu’à provoquer des jurons ou des blasphèmes contre Dieu?
Ai-je manqué à un vœu fait à Dieu?

Troisième Commandement:

Souvenez –vous de sanctifier le Sabbat.

Ai-je manqué la Messe le dimanche ou une fête d’obligation?
Ai-je été en retard à la Messe ou l’ai-je écourtée par ma faute?
Ai-je fait manquer la Messe à d’autres ou leur ai-je fait écourter la Messe?
Ai-je été volontairement distrait pendant la Messe ?
Ai-je fait ou commander un travail servile non nécessaire le dimanche ou les jours de fête d’obligation?
Ai-je acheté ou vendu sans nécessité ce jour là?

Quatrième Commandement:

Honore ton père et ta mère.

Ai-je désobéi ou manqué de respect envers mes parents ou ai-je négligé ou refusé de les aider dans leurs besoins ?
Ai-je manqué de respect pour des personnes chargées de me commander?
Ai-je calomnié ou insulté des prêtres ou d’autres personnes consacrées à Dieu?
Ai-je manqué de respect vis à vis des personnes âgées?
Ai-je maltraité mon conjoint ou mes enfants?
Ai-je désobéi ou manqué de respect à mon mari?
En ce qui concerne mes enfants:

Ai-je négligé leurs besoins matériels?
Me suis-je soucié de les faire baptiser de bonne heure?1
Ai-je pris soin de leur éducation religieuse personnelle?
Leur ai-je permis de négliger leurs devoirs religieux?
Leur ai-je permis le flirt ou des fréquentations régulières sans perspective du mariage dans un proche avenir?
Ai-je veillé à leurs compagnies?
Ai-je omis de les discipliner quand c’était nécessaire?
Leur ai-je donné un mauvais exemple?
Les ai-je scandalisés par des disputes avec mon conjoint en présence de mes enfants? En jurant ou blasphémant en leur présence?
Ai-je gardé la modestie à la maison?
Leur ai-je permis de porter des vêtements immodestes (mini jupes, pantalons serrés, robes ou pulls trop ajustés, corsages transparents, shorts courts, tenues de bain provocantes, etc.)? 2
Leur ai-je refusé la liberté de se marier ou de suivre une vocation religieuse?

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1 Les nouveaux nés devraient être baptisés dès que possible. Sauf prescription diocésaines particulières, il semble généralement admis qu’un nouveau-né devrait être baptisé dans l’intervalle de une semaine ou dix jours environ après sa naissance. Beaucoup de catholiques repoussent le baptême à une quinzaine ou un peu plus. L’idée d’administrer le baptême dans les trois jours après la naissance est considérée comme trop stricte. Saint Alphonse, suivant l’opinion commune, pensait qu’un délai non motivé au-delà de dix ou onze jours serait un péché grave. Par rapport à la coutume moderne, connue et non corrigée par les Ordinaires locaux, un délai non motivé au delà d’un mois serait un péché grave. S’il n’y a pas de danger probable pour l’enfant, les parents ne peuvent être convaincus de péché grave en différant le baptême un peu au-delà de trois semaines au plus, mais l’usage de faire baptiser un nouveau-né dans l’intervalle d’environ une semaine ou dix jours après la naissance est fort recommandable et en vérité, une date plus précoce peut être recommandée à juste titre. — H. Davis S.J., Moral and Pastoral Theology, Vol. III, Pg.65, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1935

2 Demander le feuillet LF05 Règles Mariales pour la Modestie dans le vêtement.

Cinquième Commandement:

Tu ne tueras pas.

Ai-je provoqué, désiré ou hâté la mort ou la blessure physique de quelqu’un?
Ai-je entretenu de la haine contre quelqu’un?
Ai-je opprimé quelqu’un?
Ai-je désiré la vengeance?
Ai-je été cause d’inimitié entre d’autres personnes?
Ai-je querellé ou combattu quelqu’un?
Ai-je souhaité du mal à quelqu’un?
Ai-je eu l’intention ou tenté de blesser ou de maltraiter d’autres personnes?
Y a-t-il quelqu’un avec qui je refuse de parler ou contre qui je garde rancune?
Ai-je pris plaisir aux malheurs de quelqu’un?
Ai-je été jaloux ou envieux?
Ai-je pratiqué ou essayé de pratiquer un avortement ou conseillé à quelqu’un de le faire
Ai-je, d’une manière ou d’une autre, mutilé mon corps sans nécessité?
Ai-je eu des pensées de suicide ou des tentatives?
Me suis-je enivré ? Ai-je pris des drogues interdites?
Ai-je trop mangé ou est-ce que je néglige de me nourrir convenablement? (c’est à dire avec des aliments sains)
Ai-je manqué à la correction fraternelle?
Ai-je nuit à l’âme de quelqu’un, surtout aux enfants en scandalisant par le mauvais exemple?
Ai-je nuit à moi-même en exposant mon âme aux tentations volontairement et sans nécessité. (par exemple: mauvaises émissions, mauvaises chansons, plages, etc.)?

Sixième et Neuvième Commandement:

Tu ne commettras pas d’adultère. Tu ne désireras pas la femme de ton prochain.

Ai-je refusé à mon conjoint, à ma conjointe, les droits du mariage?
Ai-je pratiqué le contrôle des naissances (pilules, appareils, retrait)?
Ai-je abusé des droits du mariage de quelque autre manière?
Ai-je commis l’adultère ou la fornication ( pratiques sexuelles prémaritales)?
Ai-je commis un péché contre nature dans le domaine de la pureté (homosexualité ou lesbianisme en pensée, en parole ou en action )?
Ai-je touché ou embrassé quelqu’un de manière impure?
Me suis-je engagé dans des baisers prolongés et passionnés en dehors du mariage ?
Me suis-je engagé dans des affections désordonnées?
Ai-je pratiqué l’impureté solitairement ( masturbation )?
Ai-je entretenu des pensées impures et m’y suis-je complu?
Me suis-je laissé aller à des désirs sensuels pour quelqu’un ou ai-je volontairement désiré voir ou faire quelque chose d’impur?
Me suis-je laissé aller volontairement à quelque plaisir sexuel complet ou incomplet en dehors du mariage?
Ai-je été occasion de péché pour d’autres en portant des vêtements immodestes, trop serrés ou provocants de toute autre manière?
Ai-je agi pour provoquer ou occasionner chez les autres des pensées ou des désirs impurs délibérément ou par légèreté?
Ai-je fait des lectures indécentes ou regardé de mauvais film?
Ai-je regardé des films et des émissions érotiques ou la pornographie par internet ou permis à des enfants de le faire?
Ai-je prononcé des paroles ou raconté des histoires indécentes?
Ai-je écouté volontairement de telles histoires?
Me suis-je vanté de mes péchés ou complu dans les péchés du passé?
Me suis-je trouvé en compagnie impudique?
Ai-je consenti à des regards impudiques?
Ai-je négligé de contrôler mon imagination?
Ai-je prié tout de suite pour bannir de si mauvaises pensées et tentations?
Ai-je évité la paresse, la gourmandise, l’oisiveté et les occasions d’impureté?
Ai-je pris part à des danses immodestes et à des spectacles indécents?
Suis-je resté sans nécessité seul en compagnie de quelqu’un du sexe opposé en dehors du mariage?

Nota bene: Ne pas craindre de dire au prêtre tout péché d’impureté que vous avez pu commettre. Ne pas cacher ou essayer de déguiser de tels péchés. Le prêtre est là pour vous aider et vous pardonner. Rien de ce que vous dites ne le choquera, donc ne craignez pas, quelque puisse être votre honte.

Septième et Dixième Commandement:

Tu ne voleras pas. Tu ne convoitera pas les biens du prochains.

Ai-je volé quelque chose? Quoi ou combien?
Ai-je endommagé le bien des autres?
Ai-je par négligence abîmé le bien des autres?
Ai-je été négligent dans la gestion de l’argent et des biens d’autrui?
Ai-je triché ou fraudé?
Ai-je participé excessivement à des jeux d’argent?
Ai-je refusé ou négligé de payer mes dettes?
Ai-je acquis un bien notoirement volé?
Ai-je omis de rendre des objets prêtés?
Ai-je trompé mon employeur sur ma journée de travail?
Ai-je triché sur les salaires de mes employés?
Ai-je refusé ou négligé d’aider quelqu’un en urgente nécessité?
Ai-je omis de restituer en cas de vol, de tricherie ou de fraude?
Ai-je envié à un autre ce qu’il avait?
Ai-je été jaloux du bien d’autrui?
Ai-je été avare?
Ai-je été cupide et avare, accordant trop d’importance aux biens matériels et au confort? Mon cœur est-il porté vers les possessions terrestres ou les vrais trésors du Ciel ?

Huitième Commandement:

Tu ne porteras pas de faux témoignage envers ton prochain.

Ai-je menti à propos de quelqu’un?
Mes mensonges ont-ils causé un tort matériel ou spirituel?
Ai-je porté des jugements téméraires (c’est à dire cru fermement, sans preuve évidente à la culpabilité de quelqu’un dans un crime ou une faute morale?
Ai-je nui à la bonne réputation de quelqu’un en révélant des fautes vraies mais cachées (délation )?
Ai-je révélé les péchés d’autrui?
Ai-je été coupable de cafardage (c’est à dire d’avoir rapporté quelque chose de défavorable dit par quelqu’un à propos d’un autre de manière à créer l’inimitié entre eux)?
Ai-je encouragé ou prêté l’oreille à la diffusion du scandale concernant mon prochain?
Ai-je prêté de faux serments ou signé de faux documents?
Suis-je critique, négatif ou peu charitable dans ma conversation?
Ai-je flatté les autres?

Les Sept Péchés Capitaux et les Vertus opposées.

Orgueil..............................................Humilité
Avarice............................................Libéralité
Luxure.............................................Chasteté
Colère...............................................Douceur
Gourmandise....................................Tempérance
Jalousie...........................................Amour fraternel
Paresse............................................Effort

Cinq effets de l’Orgueil

La vaine gloiren a. Vantardise b. Dissimulation/Duplicité
Ambition
Mépris des autres
Colère / Vengeance / Ressentiment
Entêtement / Obstination

Neuf manières d’être instrument de péché pour d’autres.

A. Ai-je sciemment été cause de péché ?
B. Ai-je coopéré au péché des autres ?

Le conseil
Le commandement
Le consentement
La provocation
La louange ou la flatterie
La dissimulation
La participation
Le silence
La défense du mal accompli.

Les Quatre Péchés qui crient vengeance au Ciel.

Le meurtre volontaire
La Sodomie ou le Lesbianisme
L’oppression des pauvres
La fraude sur le juste salaire du travailleur.

Les Six Commandements de l’Eglise.

Ai-je entendu la Messe le dimanche et les fêtes d’obligation?
Ai-je pratiqué le jeûne et l’abstinence les jours désignés et ai-je observé le jeûne eucharistique?
Me suis-je confessé au moins une fois l’an?
Ai-je reçu la Sainte Eucharistie au temps de Pâques?
Ai-je contribué au soutien de l’Eglise dans la mesure où je le dois?
Ai-je observé les lois de l’Eglise concernant le mariage (c’est à dire le mariage sans présence d’un prêtre ou mariage avec un parent ou non-catholique)?

Les Cinq Blasphèmes contre le Cœur Immaculé de Marie.

Ai-je blasphémé contre l’Immaculée Conception?
Ai-je blasphémé contre la Virginité Perpétuelle de Marie?
Ai-je blasphémé contre la Divine Maternité de Notre Dame ? Ai-je manqué à reconnaître Notre Dame comme Mère de tous les hommes?
Ai-je cherché officiellement à semer dans les cœurs des enfants l’indifférence ou le mépris, ou même la haine de ce Cœur Immaculé?
L’ai-je outragée directement dans Ses Saintes Images?

Finalement:

Ai-je reçu la Sainte Communion en état de péché mortel? (Sacrilège)

Examen des péchés véniels d’après St Antoine-Marie Claret.

L’âme devrait éviter tous les péchés véniels, spécialement ceux qui ouvrent la voie du péché mortel. Ce n’est pas assez , mon âme, de prendre la ferme résolution de souffrir la mort plutôt que de commettre un péché mortel. Il est nécessaire de former une résolution semblable par rapport au péché véniel. Celui qui ne trouve pas en lui-même cette volonté ne peut trouver la sécurité. Rien ne peut nous donner une certaine sécurité du salut éternel comme une vigilance incessante pour éviter même le moindre péché véniel et un sérieux remarquable en tous points touchant toutes les pratiques de la vie spirituelle - sérieux dans la prière et les rapports avec Dieu, sérieux dans la mortification et le renoncement, sérieux dans l’humilité et l’acceptation du mépris, sérieux dans l’obéissance et le renoncement à sa volonté propre, sérieux dans l’amour de Dieu et du prochain . Celui qui veut atteindre ce sérieux et le garder, doit nécessairement prendre la résolution d’éviter toujours spécialement les péchés véniels

suivants:

Le péché d’admettre en son cœur tout soupçon non fondé, tout jugement injuste contre le prochain.
Le péché d’entrer en conversation sur les défauts d’autrui et de manquer à la charité de toute autre manière même légèrement.
Le péché d’omettre, par paresse, nos pratiques spirituelles ou de les accomplir avec négligence volontaire.
Le péché d’avoir une affection désordonnée pour quelqu’un.
Le péché d’avoir une vaine estime de soi-même ou une vaine satisfaction dans ce qui nous concerne
Le péché de recevoir le Saint Sacrement de manière insouciante, avec des distractions et autres irrévérences et sans préparation sérieuse.
Impatiences, ressentiment, tout manquement à accepter des déceptions comme venant de la Main de Dieu ; car cela met obstacle à la voie des décrets et dispositions de la Divine Providence par rapport à nous-mêmes.
Le péché de se donner occasion de ternir même de loin l’éclat immaculé de la sainte pureté.
La faute de cacher volontairement à ceux qui devraient les connaître, les mauvaises inclinations, les faiblesses et les mortifications, en cherchant à poursuivre la route de la vertu, non sous la direction de l’obéissance, mais en se laissant guider par ses propres caprices.

Nota bene: Ceci s’entend de circonstances où nous pourrions avoir une direction qui mérite d’être recherchée, mais nous préférons suivre nos faibles lumières personnelles).

Prière pour une bonne confession

O mon Dieu, par mes péchés détestables, j’ai crucifié de nouveau Votre Divin Fils et L’ai tourné en dérision. A cause de cela, j’ai mérité Votre Colère et me suis rendu digne des feux de l’Enfer. Combien aussi j’ai été ingrat envers Vous, mon Père Céleste, qui m’avez tiré du néant, m’avez racheté par le Précieux Sang de Votre Fils et m’avez sanctifié par Vos Saints Sacrements et le Saint Esprit. Mais dans Votre Miséricorde, vous m’avez réservé cette confession. Recevez –moi de nouveau comme Votre fils prodigue et accordez-moi de bien me confesser pour que je puisse recommencer à Vous aimer de tout mon cœur et de toute mon âme et par conséquent garder vos commandements et souffrir patiemment toute expiation temporelle qui reste à accomplir. J’espère obtenir de Votre bonté et puissance, la vie éternelle au Paradis. Par Jésus-Christ Notre Seigneur. Amen.

Note Finale

N’oubliez pas de confesser vos péchés avec regret surnaturel en même temps que ferme résolution de ne plus retomber dans le péché et d’éviter les occasions prochaines de péché. Demandez à votre Confesseur de vous aider en toute difficulté qui entraverait une bonne confession. Accomplissez promptement votre pénitence.

Acte de Contrition

O mon Dieu, je regrette du fond du cœur de vous avoir offensé. Et je déteste tous mes péchés, parce que je redoute la perte du Ciel et les peines de l’Enfer, mais surtout parce que mes péchés Vous offensent, mon Dieu, qui êtes toute bonté et qui méritez tout mon amour. Je prends la ferme résolution, avec le secours de Votre Grâce, de confesser mes péchés, de faire pénitence et d’amender ma vie. Amen.


EXAMEN DE CONSCIENCE POUR ADULTES

Résumé: Il faut rechercher au moins tous les péchés mortels dont on se souvient et qui n’ont pas encore été confessés dans une bonne confession et à un prêtre ayant les pouvoirs pour absoudre. Un péché est mortel s’il y a : gravité de matière, pleine connaissance et plein consentement. Indiquer, dans la mesure du possible, leur espèce et leur nombre (même pour les désirs). Pour cela on demande à Dieu la grâce de bien connaître ses fautes et on s’examine sur les Dix Commandements et les préceptes de l’Église, sur les péchés capitaux et les devoirs de notre état. Il faudra penser à accuser également les péchés qui ont pu être commis par omission. N.B.: La confession est sacrilège lorsqu’on a volontairement caché des fautes mortelles. COMMANDEMENTS DE DIEU l er Commandement : « Tu adoreras Dieu seul et tu l’aimeras plus que tout. » Dieu est-il au centre de ma vie ? Est-il bien pour moi un Père à l’amour duquel je réponds par un amour total et une généreuse obéissance ? Jésus est-il vraiment mon Maître et mon modèle, celui dont je vis par la foi et les sacrements ? Manquements par omission ou négligence dans les prières (matin, soir, dans les tentations) et la réception des sacrements. Tiédeur. Respect humain pour manifester sa foi. Parole ou acte contre la religion. Adhésion à des mouvements incompatibles avec la foi catholique. Superstitions, spiritisme. Avoir tenté Dieu. Péchés contre la foi : refus d’adhérer à une ou plusieurs vérités révélées. Doutes volontaires. Négligeance dans sa sa propre formation religieuse. Lectures, émissions et spectacles portant atteinte à la foi ou à la morale. Péchés contre l’espérance : manque de confiance en la bonté et la providence de Dieu. Découragement, désespoir. Compter sur ses seules forces. Prétexter de la bonté de Dieu pour pécher. Ne pas désirer le ciel. Péchés contre la charité : indifférence par rapport à Dieu ; absence de prière et de pratique religieuse. Sacrilèges en profanant les choses saintes, en particulier confessions (incomplètes volontairement) et communions sacrilèges (reçues en état de péché mortel). Envers le prochain : refus de voir Dieu dans nos frères; haines, mépris, moqueries ; refus d’assister son prohain dans les graves nécessités. 2e Commandement : « Tu ne prononceras le nom de Dieu qu’avec respect. » Transgresser les serments et vœux faits en son nom. Associer son nom à des serments faux ou inutiles. Blasphémer son nom, celui de la Vierge ou des saints. Prononcer des imprécations contre soi ou contre autrui. 3e Commandement : « Tu sanctifieras le jour du Seigneur. » Avoir manqué à la sainte Messe par sa faute, y être arrivé en retard. Avoir fait ou fait faire “des travaux et des occupations qui empêchent le culte dû à Dieu, la joie propre au jour du Seigneur, ou la détente convenable de l’esprit et du corps” (can.1247). Avoir été à des amusements ou réunions dangereuses pour la foi ou les mœurs. 4e Commandement : « Tu honoreras ton père et ta mère. » Enfants de tous âges : Manque d’amour, de respect, d’obéissance (dans les limites de leur autorité), de reconnaissance et d’assistance (matérielle, spirituelle) aux parents. Parents : ne pas témoigner de l’affection à tous ses enfants ; ne pas leur donner l’exemple d’une vie vertueuse et chrétienne. Envers ceux encore sous leur dépendance : Association Notre Dame de Chrétienté manquements dans leur formation humaine et chrétienne (instruction religieuse, choix de l’école); et dans ses devoirs de surveillance, de conseil et de corrections nécessaires. Tous : disputes d’intérêt en famille. Manquements dans l’accomplissement du travail dans le respect dû à l’autorité (dans le métier, la vie collective) ou dans les responsabilités des dirigeants (conditions de travail honnêtes, juste salaire, respect vis-à-vis des employés). Insoumission aux lois civiles justes (impôts, service militaire, devoir civique). 5e Commandement : « Tu ne tueras point. » Meurtre, tentative de suicide, imprudence exposant à tuer ou blesser son prochain (sport à risque, transgression grave et volontaire du code de la route, conduite en état d’ivresse). Colères, disputes, vengeances, refus de pardon, rancunes, envie, jalousie, drogue. Excès dans les boissons, gourmandise. Attitude insultante et scandaleuse. Participation (par action ou par omission), à la stérilisation, à l’avortement, à l’euthanasie, au suicide. Incitation à la violence, à la lutte des classes. Haine raciale ou ethnique. 6e et 9e Commandements : « Tu ne commettras pas d’impureté. Tu n’auras pas le désir impur volontaire. » Pensées, désirs et actes commis seul ou avec d’autres contre la pureté. Conversations et chansons déshonnêtes. Lectures, spectacles (TV, films,...), fréquentation de lieux exposant à l’impureté. Responsabilité dans le péché d’autrui (danse, mode et attitude provocantes). Personnes mariées : Limitation de l’usage du mariage aux jours inféconds sans cause sérieuse. Moyens contraceptifs, ponctuels ou permanents. Refus des droits du conjoint. Adultère (pensées, désirs, actions). Infidélité affective. Liaison extra-matrimoniale. Divorce. “Remariage”. Fiancés : Manifestations de tendresse excessivement sensuelles. Relations pré matrimoniales. Cohabitation. 7e et 10e Commandements : « Tu ne voleras pas. Tu ne désireras pas injustement le bien des autres. » Participation direct ou indirect à des vols, fraudes, injustices. Dettes impayées. Non restitution. Recel d’objets volés. Tort causé dans les ventes, contrats, transactions. Tricheries. Fraudes. Pots de vin. Non-respect des lois sociales justes sur le travail, les assurances... Travail bâclé ; perte de temps. Dépenses excessives, par luxe, vanité, etc. Gaspillage. 8e Commandement : « Tu ne mentiras point. » Mensonges. Faux témoignage. Accusations injustes. Jugements téméraires. Calomnies (personnes ou institutions). Secrets violés. Médisances, ragots. Refus de réparer ou de rectifier COMMANDEMENTS DE L’ÉGLISE 1. Tu sanctifieras les dimanches et fêtes d’obligation (en France : Noël, Pâques, Ascension, La Pentecôte, Assomption, Toussaint) : par l’assistance à la messe et l’abstention d’activités contraires à la sanctification du jour du Seigneur (voir 3e commandement de Dieu). 2. Tu te confesseras au moins une fois l’an. 3. Tu communieras chaque année au Temps pascal (de Pâques à la Pentecôte). 4. Tu jeûneras ou feras abstinence les jours fixés. Jeûne et abstinence: Mercredi des Cendres et Vendredi Saint ; abstinence : tous les vendredis de l’année (les vendredis autres que ceux du Carême, on peut remplacer l’abstinence par une autre pénitence). 5. Tu contribueras selon tes moyens aux dépenses de l’Eglise. Association Notre Dame de Chrétienté DEVOIRS D’ÉTAT 1. Devoirs de chrétien : effort pour tendre à la perfection de la charité ; témoignage de cohérence entre la foi et les œuvres ; fidélité à la vocation reçue de Dieu ; dimension apostolique de sa vie ; approfondissement de sa foi ; aide à l’Eglise ; respect et obéissance à la hiérarchie dans ce qui dépend de son autorité. 2. Devoirs dans la famille : fidélité et don de soi dans le mariage ; générosité dans la procréation et l’éducation des enfants ; amour et entraide ; affection et assistance aux ascendants. 3. Devoirs dans la profession application au travail ; sens de la justice dans les rapports professionnels, dans les contrats. 4. Devoirs dans la cité : participation à la vie de la cité, devoir électoral ; respect des lois justes ; effort pour faire changer les lois injustes (avortement, ...) ; solidarité avec les plus démunis. MAÎTRISE DE SON TEMPÉRAMENT Il faut soumettre à la raison et à la loi de Dieu les passions déréglées par le péché originel et nos propres péchés. On distingue sept tendances qui nous inclinent au mal : - l’orgueil : amour désordonné de soi-même qui engendre l’ambition, la présomption, la vaine gloire, les attitudes hautaines, les vanités mondaines. - l’avarice : attachement désordonné aux richesses qui engendre l’injustice, l’endurcissement du cœur, le défaut de générosité pour faire l’aumône, l’aveuglement de l’esprit. - la luxure : vice contraire, voir 6e et 9e commandements. - L’envie : nous attriste à la vue des qualités ou des succès d’autrui ; engendre la calomnie, la jalousie, les discordes, les actions portant tort à autrui. - la gourmandise : excès dans le manger et le boire (alcoolisme) qui met en danger notre santé et nous fait perdre la possession de nous-mêmes. - la colère : fait perdre le contrôle de soi-même et porte aux injures, querelles, coups... - la paresse : incline à fuir l’effort dans le travail, l’accomplissement des devoirs. Association Notre Dame de Chrétienté

Mit freundlichen Grüssen

Avec mes meilleurs salutations
Distinti saluti
Kind regards, yours sincerely
Saludos cordiales
בברכה, בכבוד רב
С уважение
ขอแสดงความนับถือ
你的真诚的
المخلص

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Avec mes meilleurs salutations
Distinti saluti
Kind regards, yours sincerely

Nouvelle adresse: 23, Av. Edouard Dapples, CH 1006 LAUSANNE. SUISSE

Tél: international ++ 41 21 616 88 88

Mobilisation générale: épargnes, retraites... volées légalement !

http://desiebenthal.blogspot.ch/2015/12/projet-de-loi-dapplication-de-monnaie.html

http://desiebenthal.blogspot.ch/2015/12/swiss-positive-money-social-credit.html

Thème pour l'année 2016: Donner à chacun ce qui lui est dû par un dividende social à tous!
à faire circuler largement, merci, le monde est déjà meilleur grâce à ce simple geste de solidarité.

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